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NOTE
BORRE v. UNITED STATES: AN IMPROPER
INTERPRETATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
In its first 115 years of development, the Federal Mail Fraud Act
grew into a powerful tool for punishing crime and corruption.' The
Mail Fraud Act was described by one commentator as the govern-
ment'.s "Stradivarius . . . Colt .45 . .. Louisville Slugger ...
Cuisinart . . ." because of the law's ubiquitous effectiveness.2 The
broad scope of the law allowed the federal government to prosecute
crimes involving corruption in state and local government. However,
a look at the history of the Mail Fraud Act shows that it has been
marred by confusion from its outset in 1872.' The law was initially
subject to interpretation by both broad and strict constructions until
the Supreme Court gave support to the broad interpretation in
United States v. Young.4 Over time, the government further broad-
ened the statute's application, crystallizing with the recognition of
the intangible rights theory in 1973.1 Under the intangible rights
theory, mail fraud convictions were obtained based on the defend-
ants depriving citizens of their right to honest dealings, usually with
the government.6
This theory was recognized in all circuits until 1987, when the
Supreme Court overturned it in McNally v. United States.7 The
Court held that the Mail Fraud Act (Act) only applies to schemes
1. Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 DUQ. L. REV 771, 772-73
(1980).
2. Id. at 771.
3. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323 (Mail Fraud Act) (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 1342 (1988)).
4. 232 U.S. 155 (1914).
5. United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909
(1974), and cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974).
6. Id. at 766.
7. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
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that result in a loss of money or property.8 Violations of intangible
rights were no longer recognized as a cause of action. This decision
severely weakened the effectiveness of the statute. That same year,
the Supreme Court diminished the effect of McNally in Carpenter
v. United States.9 There, the Court ruled that the Mail Fraud Act
does cover the deprivation of intangible property rights, specifically,
a business's right to confidential information.1 °
With the intangible rights theory having been struck down - al-
though intangible property rights were upheld - defendants con-
victed under the Act attempted to have their convictions overturned
through either a writ of coram nobis or a writ of habeas corpus." In
these post-conviction proceedings, the courts look at the indictment
and jury instructions to see if the defendant was convicted under a
theory that charged a deprivation of money or property.12 If the de-
fendant was convicted solely on the basis of an intangible rights the-
ory, the conviction must be overturned." Many of these cases in-
volved bribery, kickbacks, security interests, confidential business
information, or licenses in which courts have overturned many con-
victions. However, in 1988, Congress amended the Mail Fraud Act
once again, re-establishing the intangible rights theory and re-
turning the law to its pre-McNally status.1"
In 1991, the Seventh Circuit, in Borre v. United States,'6 seemed
to revive the intangible rights theory despite McNally. In Borre, the
Seventh Circuit held that a cable television franchise was property
under the Mail Fraud Act. 6 The district court found that Borre was
convicted under the intangible rights theory and therefore vacated
his convictions based on McNally;17 however, the Seventh Circuit
reversed the determination of the district court by a 2-1 vote and
reinstated Borre's conviction.'
8. Id. at 359.
9. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
10. Id. at 25.
11. See LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES §§ 30, 35 (1981) (discussing these
two postconviction remedies).
12. See United States v. Lombardo, 865 F.2d 155, 158 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905
(1989); United States v. Gimbel, 830 F.2d 621, 627 (7th Cir. 1987).
13. See Magnuson v. United States, 861 F.2d 166, 168 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding an indictment
insufficient under McNally).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988).
15. 940 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1991).
16. Id. at 220.
17. Id. at 217.
18. Id. at 224.
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Borre exemplifies the current state of the law. McNally signifi-
cantly narrowed the reach of the Mail Fraud Act. The Borre court's
ruling that a cable television franchise is property for the purposes
of the statute is a sign that the scope of the law is expanding once
again.
This Note examines the early development of the Mail Fraud
Act. It shows how the law changed during its early years and how
courts interpreted the statute. The Note then looks at the intangible
rights theory and details the McNally and Carpenter decisions,
which caused an upheaval in the interpretation of the Mail Fraud
Act. The Note discusses retroactive application of McNally and the
procedures used by defendants to overturn convictions. Then it
shows how the courts look to the indictment and jury instructions to
determine if a conviction should stand. The Note also discusses
some of the relevant case law, showing what the courts have found
to be property under McNally. It specifically examines the case of
Borre v. United States and argues that the defendant there did not
deprive the government of a property interest as defined by Mc-
Nally. Finally, the Note assesses how the Borre court's interpreta-
tion of the Mail Fraud Act undermines McNally and possibly rein-
troduces the intangible rights concepts that McNally temporarily
eliminated.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Mail Fraud Act Prior to McNally
1. Introduction
The original Mail Fraud Act did not specify what crimes it cov-
ered. This led to varied interpretations of the law by the federal
courts; some viewed mail fraud as only dealing with crimes depen-
dent on the use of the mails, while others applied the statute to any
crime which incidentally used the mails. It took over forty years
before the courts and Congress approved the latter, broader con-
struction of the statute. By 1941, this broad construction of the law
led to the development of the intangible rights theory - mail fraud
convictions based on schemes that deprived citizens of the right to
an honest government.
2. Early Development of the Mail Fraud Act
In 1872, Congress passed a series of laws concerning the postal
1993] 1501
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service, which included the first statute to make mail fraud a federal
crime.19 There was no legislative history or congressional debate for
the Act (which contains 327 sections), " other than the comment of
a representative who said the laws attempted to prevent "thieves,
forgers, and rapscallions generally" from "deceiving and fleecing the
innocent people in the country."21
Commentators viewed the statute as a congressional response to
the ineffectiveness of state and local laws in combatting fraudulent
"get-rich-quick" swindles.22 Looking at the language of the statute,
however, Congress seemed to be more concerned with the degree of
mail abuse than with the degree of fraud.23
In its infancy, the statutory package survived two constitutional
attacks.24 In Ex parte Jackson,25 decided in 1877, the defendant
claimed that the postal law prohibiting the mailing of circulars for
19. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1346
(1988)). The statute provides:
That if any person having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or be effected by either opening or intending to open correspondence or com-
munication with any other person (whether resident within or outside of the United
States), by means of the post-office establishment of the United States, or by inciting.
such other person to open communication with the person so devising or intending,
shall, in and for executing such scheme or artifice (or attempting so to do), place any
letter or packet in any post-office of the United States, or take or receive any there-
from, such person, so misusing the post-office establishment, shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor, and shall be punished with a fine of not more than five hundred dollars,
with or without such imprisonment, as the court shall direct, not exceeding eighteen
calendar months. The indictment, information, or complaint may severally charge of-
fences to the number of three when committed within the same six calendar months;
but the court thereupon shall give a single sentence, and shall proportion the punish-
ment especially to the degree in which the abuse of the post-office establishment en-
ters as an instrument into such fraudulent scheme and device.
Id.; see also Rakoff, supra note 1, at 777-78 (noting that the odd design of the statute has led to
several unusual practical consequences (i.e., it results in each separate use of the mails constitut-
ing a crime)).
20. Rakoff, supra note I, at 779.
21. CONG. GLOBE. 41st Cong., 3d. Sess. 35 (1870) (statement of Rep. Farnsworth).
22. Rakoff, supra note 1, at 780 (citing WILLIAM A. DUNNING. RECONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC 224-37 (1962); HAROLD U. FAULKNER, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 483-86,
516-17 (1960); JOHN H. FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 8-9, 146-49, 174-
77 (1961)).
23. See id. at 784 (noting that the apparent function of the statute was to "deter the actual and
intentional misuse of the mails in furtherance of a truly mail fraud scheme"); see also Act of
June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988)) (telling
the sentencing court in a mail fraud prosecution to "proportion the punishment especially to the
degree in which the abuse of the post-office establishment enters as an instrument into such fraud-
ulent scheme and device").
24. See Ex parte Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
25. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
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illegal lotteries was outside the scope of Congress's regulatory pow-.
ers." A unanimous Court held that the Constitution gave Congress
the power to regulate the entire postal system of the United
States." Accordingly, the Court found that Congress had the power
to determine what was a misuse of the mails. 8 The Supreme
Court's ruling bolstered the constitutionality of all the postal laws,
including the Mail Fraud Act.29
In 1892, the Court provided further support for Congress's au-
thority over the mails in Ex parte Rapier.30 There, the defendants
were involved in a lottery scheme which used the mails, and they
argued that only the states could regulate illegal lotteries. 31 Once
again, a unanimous Court upheld Congress's power to police the
mails, stating that it was "not necessary that Congress should have
the power to deal with crime or immorality within the States in or-
der to maintain that it possesses the power to forbid the use of the
mails in aid of the perpetration of crime or immorality." 32 Because
the statute was declared constitutional, the lower courts did not
have to adopt a narrow construction of the Mail Fraud Act to avoid
constitutional challenges. 3
However, the lower courts had few guidelines to interpret the
law.34 Accordingly, the courts subsequently split in their interpreta-
tion of the new statute, generally falling into two camps: strict con-
structionists and broad constructionists.3 5 Strict constructionists
26. Id. at 728.
27. Id. at 732. The Supreme Court said that Congress's regulatory authority extended beyond
the establishment of postal routes and post office locations. Id.
28. Id. at 736 (giving the example of the prohibition on obscene materials).
29. See Rakoff, supra note 1, at 787 (noting that the language in Ex parte Jackson was so
broad "as to leave no doubt as to the constitutionality of the mail fraud statute").
30. 143 U.S. 110 (1892).
31. Id. at 133-34 (arguing that prosecuting crimes involving lotteries was not reasonably re-
lated to federal postal duties).
32. Id. at 134; see also Rakoff, supra note 1, at 788-89 (concluding that the decision in Rapier
was a direct result of the Court's prior decision in Jackson).
33. Rakoff, supra note 1, at 788.
34. See id. at 789 (noting that "the mail emphasizing language ... virtually compelled com-
ment from the courts" but that its ambiguity left the courts without guidelines for interpretation).
35. Id. at 790. Compare United States v. Mitchell, 36 F. 492 (W.D. Pa. 1888) (deciding that
backdating a postmark to avoid termination of an insurance policy is not mail fraud) and United
States v. Owens, 17 F. 72 (E.D. Mo. 1883) (ruling that the mail fraud statute does not cover
transactions between creditor and debtor) with United States v. Horman, 118 F. 780 (S.D. Ohio
1901) (holding that the federal mails are not to be used to further dishonest practices), aJid, 116
F. 350 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 187 U.S. 641 (1902) and United States v. Jones, 10 F. 469
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882) (holding that the use of the mails to induce purchase of counterfeit money
is mail fraud). Rakoff states that attitudes towards federalism, the social and economic biases of
19931 1503
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looked at the mail-emphasizing language in the statute as limiting
its application to frauds that could only be perpetrated by using the
mails. 6 This interpretation of the mail fraud statute was convenient
because a simple "but for the use of the mails" test could be ap-
plied. 37 The strict constructionist approach resulted in courts refus-
ing to apply the statute to schemes of a "local and trivial nature.'"38
Moreover, strict constructionists never defined what the Act meant
by a scheme to defraud, and since very few schemes were so reliant
on the mails to fall within the strict constructionist approach, such a
definition was unnecessary. 9
The broad constructionists did not let the mail-emphasizing lan-
guage limit their definition of a scheme to defraud.40 The courts us-
ing this approach found that any scheme where the defendants in-
tentionally used the mails to defraud came within the statute.4 1
Furthermore, the broad constructionists applied the Mail Fraud Act
to all schemes to defraud, not just to fraud recognized under the
common law or state law. 2
For seventeen years, the two schemes co-existed and "seemed to
inhibit the development of strong precedent. '4 3 Due to the two di-
the judges, and the judges' "degree of moral concern" as related to the substantiality of the fraud
were what guided judges in their construction of the mail fraud statute. Rakoff, supra note 1, at
800.
36. Rakoff, supra note 1, at 791, 793; see. e.g., United States v. Clark, 121 F. 190 (M.D. Pa.
1903) (finding that fraudulent advertising circulars sent through the mail could have been sent by
other means); see also United States v. Mitchell, 36 F. 492 (W.D. Pa. 1888) (ruling that a
scheme to defraud an insurance company was not within the scope of the mail fraud statute);
United States v. Owens, 17 F. 72 (E.D. Mo. 1883) (stating that mail fraud laws are not intended
to cover all commercial correspondence).
37. Rakoff, supra note I, at 793; see also Clark, 121 F. at 191 (holding that the use of the
mails is not enough, but rather it must be such use to successfully perpetrate the fraud).
38. Rakoff, supra note I, at 792; see Owens, 17 F. at 74 (giving a narrow definition of what
types of cases constitute mail fraud).
39. Rakoff, supra note 1, at 794; cf Owens, 17 F. at 74 (failing to define "schemes of fraud").
40. Rakoff, supra note 1, at 796.
41. See United States v. Horman, 118 F. 780 (S.D. Ohio 1901) (finding that blackmail falls
within the mail fraud statute), aff'd, 116 F. 350 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 187 U.S. 641 (1902);
Weeber v. United States, 62 F. 740 (C.C.D. Colo. 1894) (holding that posing as a U.S. attorney
to blackmail a victim is a scheme to defraud); United States v. Jones, 10 F. 469, 470
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882) (stating that "the gist of the offence consists in the abuse of the mail"); see
also Rakoff, supra note I, at 798-99 (noting that broad constructionists found no limitations on
the language of the statute):
42. See, e.g., United States v. Loring, 91 F. 881, 887 (N.D. 111. 1884) (finding that any scheme
to defraud which uses the mail, whether or not it is covered by other statutes, is mail fraud).
43. Jeffrey J. Dean & Doye E. Green, McNally v. United States and Its Effect on the Federal
Mail Fraud Statute: Will White Collar Criminals Get a Break?, 39 MERCER L. REV. 697, 701
(1988). During this seventeen-year period, the Supreme Court did not side with either construe-
1504
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vergent interpretations of the law, Congress attempted to clarify in-
terpretation by enacting the 1889 Amendment to the Mail Fraud
Act."' The law now enumerated specific crimes that were mail
fraud."5 These additional schemes were connected to the original
schemes to defraud by the use of the disjunctive "or."" 6 However,
confusion still reigned. Strict constructionists thought the additions
to the statute limited the law to only those crimes.47 On the other
tion. See United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483 (1888) (addressing whether the indictment should
fit within the language of the statute or specifically detail the scheme used); Ex parte Henry, 123
U.S. 372 (1887) (addressing the penalty provisions in the statute).
44. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, 25 Stat. 873 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §1341 (1988)).
The amendment reads:
If any person having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, or distribute, supply, or
furnish, or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, bank notes, pa-
per money, or any obligation or security of the United States or of any State, Terri-
tory, municipality, company, corporation, or person, or anything represented to be or
intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious articles, or any scheme or
artifice to obtain money by or through correspondence, by what is commonly called
the "sawdust swindle," or "counterfeit money fraud," or by dealing or pretending to
deal in what is commonly called "green articles," "green coin," "bills," "paper
goods," "spurious Treasury notes," "United States goods," "green cigars," or any
other names or terms intended to be understood as relating to such counterfeit or
spurious articles, to be effected by either opening or intending to open correspondence
or communication with any person, whether resident within or outside the United
States, by means of the Post-Office Establishment of the United States, or by inciting
such other person or any person to open communication with the person so devising or
intending, shall, in and for executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do,
place or cause to be placed, any letter, packet, writing, circular, pamphlet, or adver-
tisement in any post-office, branch post-office, or street or hotel letter-box of the
United States, to be sent or delivered by the said post-office establishment, or shall
take or receive any such therefrom, such person so misusing the post-office establish-
ment shall, upon conviction, be punishable by a fine of not more than five hundred
dollars and by imprisonment for not more than eighteen months, or by both such
punishments, at the discretion of the court. The indictment, information, or complaint
may severally charge offenses to the number of three when committed within the
same six calendar months; but the court thereupon shall give a single sentence, and
shall proportion the punishment especially to the degree in which the abuse of the
post-office establishment enters as an instrument into such fraudulent scheme and
device.
id.
45. Dean & Green, supra note 43, at 701; see Rakoff, supra note I, at 809 (noting that when
Congress amended the statute it expressly included certain specific schemes within its scope).
46. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 5480, 25 Stat. 873 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1346
(1988)) (describing "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or to sell, dispose of. (emphasis
added)).
47. Rakoff, supra note I, at 809; see United States v. Beach, 71 F. 160, 161 (D. Colo. 1895)
(stating that "[tihe statute is not limited to the particular deceits mentioned in it, . . . for the first
clause embraces 'any scheme or artifice to defraud'; but these words must be taken to mean any
scheme or artifice of the general character of those specified in the act," but not including schemes
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side, broad constructionists thought the amendment endorsed their
interpretation, as many of the schemes specified in the amendment
were the same schemes they had found illegal under the old law.48
In 1895, the Supreme Court came close to endorsing the broad
constructionist view of the Mail Fraud Act in Durland v. United
States.49 The Durland defendants claimed that the Mail Fraud Act
applied only to common law fraud and the concept of false pre-
tenses z0 The Court rejected this argument. The Court stated that
the mail fraud "statute is broader than is claimed" and held that
promises and misrepresentations as to the future fit within the scope
of the statute.5"
Subsequently, Congress further amended the Mail Fraud Act in
1909.52 This amendment incorporated the Durland holding,53 and it
eliminated the mail-emphasizing language. 4 Accordingly, since
Congress eliminated the language referring to "misusing the post-
office establishment,"5 federal courts ruled that prosecutors no
of a different character); cf. Milby v. United States, 120 F. I (6th Cir. 1903) (holding that spe-
cific crimes were just additions to the statute); Culp v. United States, 82 F. 990 (3d Cir. 1897)
(noting that the amendment did not narrow the scope of the statute to specific schemes). Con-
gress, once again, left no legislative history to guide the lower courts. Dean & Green, supra note
43, at 701 n.40.
48. Rakoff, supra note I, at 809.
49. 161 U.S. 306 (1896); see Dean & Green, supra note 43, at 701; Rakoff, supra note 1, at
811-12. The Durland defendants sold bonds to people, never intending to pay them back on the
date of maturity. Durland, 161 U.S. at 312.
50. Durland, 161 U.S. at 312. Under the principles of common law fraud and false pretenses,
"there must be a misrepresentation as to some existing fact and not a mere promise of the future."
Id.
51. Id. at 313.
52. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1115, 1130 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (1988)). The statute reads in pertinent part as follows:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representa-
tions, or promises ...shall, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or
attempting so to do, place, or cause to be placed, any letter, postal card, package,
writing, circular, pamphlet, or advertisement, whether addressed to any person resid-
ing within or outside the United States, in any post-office, or station thereof, or street
or other letter box of the United States, or authorized depository for mail matter, to
be sent or delivered by the post-office establishment of the United States, or shall take
or receive any such therefrom, whether mailed within or without the United States
• ..shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
Id.
53. Dean & Green, supra note 43, at 702.
54. Rakoff, supra note I, at 816.
55. Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 5480, 25 Stat. 873 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(1988)).
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longer had to show a criminal intent to misuse the mails. 66 The mis-
use of mails thus became incidental to the fraud itself.5 7 This
amendment destroyed all support for the strict constructionists.
5 8
Five years later, in 1914, the Supreme Court, in United States v.
Young,59 interpreted section 215 of the Criminal Code and set up
the two elements needed for a successful prosecution under the Mail
Fraud Act."0 First, the scheme must be devised to defraud, or to
obtain money or property by false pretenses.61 Second, the mails
must have been used to effectuate the scheme, with merely one let-
ter being enough to qualify. 2 By reiterating the language in the
statute, the Court made the law easier to apply.63 Thus, by 1914,
the federal government had jurisdiction over "any and all schemes
to defraud that involved an act of mailing.""'
Just two years later, the Supreme Court further clarified the Mail
Fraud Act in Badders v. United States6 5 The Court held that Con-
gress could find the act of using the mail to perpetrate a fraud ille-
gal, even if it could not regulate the scheme itself.66 This decision
appeared to remove all limitations courts had previously placed on
the Mail Fraud Act. 7
After Badders, "it was only a matter of time before federal prose-
56. Rakoff, supra note 1, at 816; see United States v. Young, 232 U.S. 155 (1914) (comparing
§ 5480 of the Revised Statutes from 1889 with the new 1909 amendment and finding that intent
to misuse the mails is unnecessary).
57. Rakoff, supra note 1, at 816; see Dean & Green, supra note 43, at 702 ("The removal of
these key phrases leaves the statute so bare that it can only be seen as a tool to fight corruption
and not as a means of protecting the integrity of the mails.").
58. Rakoff, supra note I, at 817 (stating that "[tihe minimal use of the mails that would
trigger the statute could, within broad limits, be an incidental or even accidental accompaniment
of the defendant's fraudulent scheme"); see, e.g., United States v. Young, 232 U.S. 155, 161
(1914) (defining the scope of the statute).
59. 232 U.S. 155 (1914).
60. Id. at 161.
61. Id.
62. Id. The Supreme Court said this was all that was needed and that "[tlhe District Court
apparently overlooked the distinction between the sections [of the statute] and was of the opinion
that something more was necessary to an offense under § 215, than the averment of the scheme
and its attempted execution in the manner stated." Id.
63. Dean & Green, supra note 43, at 703.
64. Rakoff, supra note 1, at 817.
65. 240 U.S. 391 (1916). The defendant argued, inter alia, that Congress could not regulate a
scheme fraudulent in itself. Id. at 393.
66. Id. The Court found such acts contrary to public policy. Id. Congress could now regulate
acts that were not criminal, as long as the acts furthered a fraudulent scheme which used the
mails. Id.
67. Rakoff, supra note 1, at 818.
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cutors realized the potential of what is now section 1341. ' '68 Subse-
quently, Congress amended the Mail Fraud Act three more times,
each time making minor alterations in the wording of the statute.6 9
3. Intangible Rights
The courts continued to find new applications for the Mail Fraud
Act. By 1941, the statute was being applied to cases that resulted in
no monetary loss to the victims of the scheme to defraud.7" Previ.-
ously, to successfully prosecute a mail fraud conviction, the victim
had to lose money. This new intangible rights theory expanded the
scope of mail fraud prosecutions. Rather than losing money, the vic-
tims of these schemes, which usually involved employment or gov-
ernmental relationships, lost intangible rights. However, it took
three decades before prosecutors began pursuing intangible rights
convictions in earnest.
In 1973, the little-used intangible rights theory was applied in
United States v. States.7' The Eighth Circuit responded with enthu-
siastic support for the theory. In States, the defendants argued that
the Mail Fraud Act72 did not apply to their scheme, as the law only
covered deprivations of money or property. 73  This argument re-
68. Dean & Green, supra note 43, at 703.
69. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 763 (editing the statute) (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 1341); Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 34, 63 Stat. 94 (replacing the phrase "dispose
or" with "dispose of") (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1341); Act of August 12, 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-375, § (6)(j)(1 1), 84 Stat. 778 (replacing the phrase "post office department" with "postal
service") (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1341); see John J. O'Connor, McNally v. United States:
Intangible Rights Mail Fraud Declared a Dead Letter, 37 CATH. U. L. REv. 851, 862 n.100
(1988) (analyzing the revisions in the statute and finding that they had no substantial impact on
its enforcement).
70. In 1941, the Fifth Circuit decided Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941). The defendants, using the mails, bribed members of the Board of
Levee Commissioners of Orleans Levee District to adopt the defendant's proposed plan for re-
funding outstanding bonds. Id. at 114-15. The court said that a scheme to defraud citizens of a
board member's fair judgment was punishable under the mail fraud statute. Id. at 115.
In United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., the Massachusetts District Court found that inter-
ference with an honest employer-employee relationship was prohibited by the mail fraud statute.
47 F. Supp. 676, 678 (D. Mass. 1942). The defendants bribed employees of their competitor to
obtain the competitor's experimental products. Id.
71. 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974), and cert. denied, 417 U.S.
950 (1974). The States defendants falsified voter registration affidavits to aid the write-in cam-
paign of a republican candidate for committeeman in St. Louis. Id. at 763. The defendants then
sent in the absentee ballots from the fictitious voters. Id. Alert mail carriers notified the post office
that ballots were being sent to nonexistent persons, and the defendants were discovered. Id.
72. Codified then, as it is now, at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
73. States, 488 F.2d at 763.
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quired a conjunctive reading of the portion of the act making illegal
"any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or prop-
erty . . . ,, , The court disregarded this analysis and said it was
more natural to read the two phrases independently.75 The court
thus held that a "scheme or artifice to defraud" did not require a
loss of money or property.78  In so concluding, the court looked at
past cases that supported a broad construction of the Mail Fraud
Act.7 The court held that the defendants were guilty of mail fraud,
even though the victims did not lose money or property. 8
Subsequently, the government used the intangible rights theory to
reach public officials who failed to disclose material information
while concealing corrupt activities.79 As long as the failure to dis-
close was combined with the use of mails to carry out a fraud, the
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (emphasis added).
75. States, 488 F.2d at 764.
76. Id.
77. Id.; Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896); Shushan v. United States, 117
F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941); see also Gouled v. United States, 273 F.
506, 508 (2d Cir. 1921) (finding that kickbacks to an officer authorized to make contracts on
behalf of the government constituted mail fraud). But cf. United States v. Regent Office Supply
Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1179 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that false representations that did not affect a
customer's understanding of the bargain were not mail fraud).
The States court also looked at mail fraud cases involving bribery which indicated that a depri-
vation of political rights was a type of offense under the statute. States, 488 F.2d at 765-66. It
placed great weight on the ruling in United States v. Faser, 303 F. Supp. 380, 385 (E.D. La.
1969), where the district court stated that "it is a violation of the statute in question if a person
defrauds the State out of the 'loyal and faithful services of an employee.' " Id.
78. States, 488 F.2d at 766. States was followed by a "snowball" of intangible rights cases.
Dean & Green, supra note 43, at 706. The Second Circuit, in United States v. Mandel, found the
former Governor of Maryland guilty of mail fraud for taking bribes to influence his position on
legislation. 591 F.2d 1347, 1357-58 (4th Cir. 1979). It stated, "At this late date, there can be no
real contention that many schemes to defraud a state and its citizens of intangible rights . . . may
not fall within the purview of the mail fraud statute." Id. at 1362. The court recognized the
concern of other courts that the Mail Fraud Act was reaching areas thought best left to the states.
Id. at 1357; see United States v. Caldwell, 544 F.2d 691, 697 (4th Cir. 1976) (Widener, J.,
concurring) (casting doubt on a further expansion of the mail fraud statute); United States v.
McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1252 (8th Cir. 1976) (refusing to extend the already pervasive mail
fraud statute to the practice of tipping others as an expression of appreciation for the performance
of ministerial tasks); United States v. Edwards, 458 F.2d 875, 880 (5th Cir.) (stating that the
Federal Mail Fraud Act must be strictly construed so as to avoid extension beyond Congress's
intent), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 891 (1972).
79. See United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.) (holding that a judge who obtained
assistance from lawyers to get bank loans committed fraud within the meaning of the mail fraud
statute), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 891 (1987); United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975)
(holding that a city employee who defrauded citizens of the city and used mails in furtherance of
his scheme was guilty of mail fraud), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976). In Bush, the press secre-
tary hid his contractual relationship with a company seeking the airline advertising contract for
O'Hare Airport. Id. at 643.
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Mail Fraud Act applied."0 This application of the Act applied
whether or not the victim or the public at large lost any money or
property."a
This broad application was welcomed by most judges and ju-
rists.8 2 Chief Justice Burger's oft-quoted dissenting opinion in
United States v. Maze8  endorsed the broad reach of the statute.
Burger called the statute the federal government's "first line of de-
fense" (i.e., a catch-all law which the government used to deal with
new crimes until Congress could get around to passing a specific
law). ' This catch-all nature did not please everyone. 85 Certainly,
the broad reach of the law made it an effective tool to prosecute
crimes otherwise not illegal under federal law.86 This is the frame-
work which existed until the Supreme Court's opinion in McNally v.
United States.87
B. The McNally Decision
In 1987, the Supreme Court ruled that the Mail Fraud Act did
80. Bush, 522 F.2d at 641.
81. Holzer, 816 F.2d at 309; see, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 811 F.2d 979, 986 (7th Cir.
1987) (finding the defendant guilty for the bribery of village officials to obtain the town's cable
television franchise); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 541, 550 (7th Cir. 1975) (finding
mail fraud after a defendant used his position as city alderman to obtain legislation favorable to
his secret interest as a property owner), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976).
82. O'Connor, supra note 69, at 853 n.30.
83. 414 U.S. 395 (1974). In Maze, the Court held that the statute did not cover a scheme to
illegally obtain a credit card. Id. at 404-05. The case did not involve the intangible rights theory.
Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, said that mail fraud should be used to stop such crimes until
the states or Congress could criminalize such schemes specifically. Id. at 406 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
84. Id. at 405-06.
85. Judge Ross, the concurring judge in the States case was concerned about the expanding
scope of the mail fraud law. United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 767 (8th Cir. 1973) (Ross, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974), and cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974). He noted,
"I cannot believe that it was the original intent of Congress that the Federal Government should
take over the prosecution of every state crime involving fraud just because the mails have been
used in furtherance of that crime." ld.; see also United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 139-40
(2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the majority
decision on mail fraud creates a danger for prosecutorial abuse for partisan political purposes),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
86. The popularity of the intangible rights theory led to a fourfold increase in federal convic-
tions of public corruption cases between 1976 and 1986. Mail Fraud: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1988)
[hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.); see also Rakoff, supra note 1, at
771.
87. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
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not cover schemes to defraud persons of their intangible rights. 8
McNally v. United States involved a scheme to get commissions
from the insurance agency that handled the state of Kentucky's
workers' compensation policy. 89 The chairman of the Kentucky
Democratic Party, Howard P. Hunt, approached the Wombwell In-
surance Company with the plan.9" Hunt asked for a cut of the com-
pany's commissions in exchange for guaranteeing that Wombwell
would continue to be the agent for the policy.9 The commissions
were then distributed to other insurance agencies designated by
Hunt.92 The defendants were convicted, and their convictions were
affirmed by the Sixth Circuit based upon the intangible rights the-
ory of mail fraud prosecutions.9 3
The Supreme Court reversed the convictions.9 The Court stated
that the Mail Fraud Act did not cover the loss of the intangible
right of citizens to an honest government.9" In making its decision,
the Court engaged in a lengthy historical analysis.98 It concluded
that despite the lack of a solid historical record, it appeared that the
legislature intended for the Mail Fraud Act to protect people from
frauds which caused a deprivation of money or property.97 Looking
to Durland v. United States98 and the subsequent 1909 amendment
to the Mail Fraud Act,99 the Court set out to interpret the wording
of the amendment.100
88. Id. at 360-61.
89. Id. at 352-53.
90. Id. at 352. Wombwell had held the workers' compensation policy of the state since 1971.
Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 353. One of those agencies was controlled by Hunt and co-defendant James E.
Gray. Id. Co-defendant Charles J. McNally passed himself off as the owner of the company,
Seton Investments, Inc. Id.
93. Id. at 354-55. See United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290 (6th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 483 U.S.
350 (1987), for the original conviction of the McNally defendants.
94. McNally, 483 U.S. at 356.
95. Id.
96. Id. The Court began the analysis by looking at the comments of Representative Farns-
worth back in 1870. Id.; see also CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (declaring that
laws were necessary "to prevent the frauds which are mostly gotten up in the large cities . . . by
thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent
people in the country").
97. McNally, 483 U.S. at 356.
98. 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
99. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, sec. 215, 35 Stat. 1130 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (1988)).
100. McNally, 483 U.S. at 357-58; see also Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, sec. 215, 35 Stat.
1130 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1341).
19931 1511
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
The Court said the phrases "schemes or artifices to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representation, or promises . . ." could be read conjunc-
tively or disjunctively.10 1 Reaching back to its decision in Ham-
merschmidt v. United States,02 the Court sought to define what was
meant by the term "defraud,"'I 3 The Hammerschmidt Court said
that the term "defraud" referred to "wronging one in his property
rights by dishonest methods or schemes" and "usually signif[ied]
the deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or
overreaching.' 0 4  The Court in McNally felt that Congress, in
drafting the 1909 amendment was acting consistently with this
definition.' 0 5
Faced with two interpretations of the Mail Fraud Act, the Court
said it would adopt the harsher interpretation only if Congress had
spoken in definite language.'0 6 Applying this so-called rule of len-
ity, 10 7 the Court held for the more lenient definition because it found
the statute ambiguous as to whether it included the intangible rights
doctrine.' 8 The Court left it to Congress to amend the law if it so
chose.' 09
The Court then applied this narrow construction of the statute to
the jury instructions. In invalidating the intangible rights theory, the
Court held that the only benefit the government received from the
Mail Fraud Act was limited "to the Government's interests as prop-
erty holder."" 0 The Court found that the government failed to show
how this interest as a property holder was violated."' It said that
the jury instructions "[did] not [require the jury] to find that the
101. McNally, 483 U.S. at 357-58.
102. 265 U.S. 182 (1924).
103. McNally, 483 U.S. at 358. Hammerschmidt was an interpretation of the predecessor of
18 U.S.C. § 371, which made it a crime to conspire to defraud the United States. Hammersch-
midt, 265 U.S. at 183-84.
104. Hammerschmidt, 265 U.S. at 188.
105. McNally, 483 U.S. at 359.
106. Id. at 360 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971); United States v. Uni-
versal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952)).
107. The rule of lenity holds that if the Court has to choose between two meanings of a statute,
it will choose the meaning that results in the least harsh result or application. See Bell v. United
States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955) ("When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to
Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.").
108. McNally, 483 U.S. at 360.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 358 n.8.
111. Id. at 360.
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Commonwealth itself was defrauded of any money or property" and
was based solely an intangible rights theory. 112 The Court then said
that even if the defendants were properly charged, the government
could not, and did not, show how the state of Kentucky lost money
or property. 113 The state was only deprived of the information that
the defendants held an interest in one of the insurance agencies in-
volved. 1 4 Accordingly, the Mail Fraud Act did not apply because
the government only proved a loss of intangible rights, and the con-
victions were overturned."
Justice Stevens replied with a critical dissent." 6 Stevens con-
cluded that under the Court's reasoning, many schemes would no
longer fall under the Mail Fraud Act. 1 7 In the fourth part of his
dissent, however, Stevens suggested two ways the government could
circumvent the Court's decision to prosecute some corrupt official
whose use of the mails would result in some loss of money or prop-
erty." First, the government could establish a loss of money when a
government official violates his fiduciary duty because "the em-
ployer" (i.e., the people) pays the government official to act faith-
fully." ' An official who does not act in the public's behalf is taking
the public's money.' 2 ' Second, the government could claim that an
official was liable under agency theory, meaning the official would
owe the government the proceeds of his scheme.' 2'
Comment and opinion on the decision was split, as the Court
overturned the law of all twelve circuits. 12 2 Some commentators sug-
gested that the Supreme Court rejected the theory because it was
concerned with federalism and how the federal government enforced
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 361 n.9.
115. Id. at 361.
116. Id. at 362 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent engaged in its own review of the history of
the mail fraud statute, including cases such as Badders, which supported a broad construction of
the law. Id. at 366; see Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916). The dissent firmly aligned
itself with the reasoning in Shushan, States, and their progeny, fully supporting the continued
existence of the intangible rights theory. McNally, 483 U.S. at 362 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. McNally, 483 U.S. at 377 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 377 n.10.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Ward v. United States, 845 F.2d 1459, 1460 (7th Cir. 1988) (describing McNally as
"a stunning setback for the [Justice] Department").
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the Mail Fraud Act. 2 ' Other commentators posited that the Court
wanted to force government prosecutors "to clearly identify the vic-
tim, and to define, in economic terms, what he or she stood to lose
and what the defendant stood to gain."' 24 Opponents felt the Court
was incorrect in ignoring the long-standing doctrine of intangible
rights. 2 5 Supporters, on the other hand, did not see McNally as
being harmful, as most frauds involved a deprivation of money or
property.'2
Throughout the statute's history, courts continually expanded the
scope of the Mail Fraud Act. Under the intangible rights theory,
federal prosecutors were able to clamp down on corruption in state
and local government. 27 The McNally decision, however, dimin-
ished the ability of prosecutors to maintain such prosecutions and
served to invalidate prior convictions under the intangible rights
theory. 28
C. The Carpenter Decision
Whether or not due to this public comment, the Supreme Court,
during the same term, subsequently re-expanded the reach of the
Mail Fraud Act with its decision in Carpenter v. United States.29
The Court in Carpenter held that the Mail Fraud Act applied to
intangible property rights as well as to tangible property rights.'3 0
The Court's decision in the case, however, did not alter the prior
decision in McNally, which removed intangible nonproperty rights
from the reach of the statute.
123. Ellen Berkowitz, Note, The Rise and Fall of the Right to Honest Government: Prosecut-
ing Public Corruption After McNally v. United States, 22 Loy. LA. L REV. 325, 371-76 (1988).
The commentators' concern was that the mail fraud statute was infringing on areas traditionally
left to the states and that the mail fraud statute was being used to do more than police the mails.
Id.
124. Craig M. Bradley, Foreword: Mail Fraud After McNally and Carpenter: The Essence of
Fraud, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 573, 595 (1988).
125. William J. Hathaway, Recent Decision, 26 DuQ. L. REV. 809, 825 (1988).
126. Donna Metcalfe Ducey, Note, McNally v. United States: The Demise of the Intangible
Rights Doctrine, 66 NC. L. REV. 1035, 1049 (1988) (concluding that the effects of the elimina-
tion of the intangible rights doctrine are speculative).
127. See Hearing, supra note 86.
128. Id. at 109. In 1988, the Justice Department estimated that 186 convictions would be
overturned.
129. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
130. Id. at 25. While intangible rights involve a person's right to honest dealings, usually with
the government, property rights are not intangible rights. However, property itself may be tangi-
ble or intangible. Id.
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The defendants in Carpenter were a reporter for the Wall Street
Journal, the reporter's roommate, who was a stockbroker, and one
of his roommate's clients. 3' The reporter, R. Foster Winans, wrote
for the Wall Street Journal's "Heard on the Street" column. 132 The
newspaper regarded the information procured for the column as
confidential until publication. 33 The column was known to affect
the price of stocks which it featured.1'3  The defendants sought to
take advantage of this effect. Winans provided his co-conspirators
with information disclosing which stocks the Wall Street Journal
would feature in upcoming editions.'35
Meanwhile, the stockbroker's employer noticed a pattern in that
broker's trading which coincided with the appearance of stocks in
the column, and this led to an investigation by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).13 The SEC's inquiries led to squab-
bling among the conspirators, and Winans and his roommate, Car-
penter, confessed to the SEC. 37 The defendants were charged with
mail fraud based upon their use of the confidential information.' 38
The district court convicted the defendants, and the appellate court
upheld the convictions. 139
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendants argued that the
use of the Wall Street Journal's confidential information deprived
the victim only of an intangible right and was therefore not subject
to the Mail Fraud Act.' 4" The Court rejected this argument.' 4'
The Court held that because confidential business information
was found to be a long-recognized intangible property right, the
entity which procured such information had an exclusive right to
benefit from it.' 43 The defendants' use of the information thus de-
prived the Wall Street Journal of both the right to control that in-
131. Id. at 22.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 23.
134. Id. at 22.
135. Id. at 23.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 24.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 25.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 26 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001-04 (1984)). According
to the Carpenter Court, the Court in Ruckelshaus looked to common law sources "such as state
law" to determine what constitutes property. Id.
143. Id.
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formation and the right to decide how it would be used.144 The
Court said this deprivation went beyond the loss of the honest and
faithful service of an employee, which would have been a mere in-
tangible rights charge. " 5 The Court held that no loss of money
needed to be shown to constitute the loss or deprivation of an intan-
gible property right, and that it was enough that the Wall Street
Journal lost exclusive use of the information.146
The Carpenter holding served to clarify the earlier McNally deci-
sion. After McNally, and until Congress acted to amend the statute,
the intangible rights theory was no longer in the arsenal of federal
prosecutors. Prosecutors were required to show a loss of property by
the victim to obtain a mail fraud conviction. After Carpenter, how-
ever, the property no longer had to be in a tangible form because
the Court recognized that intangible items, such as information, can
be classified as property.'47
D. The Aftermath: Overturning Convictions
1. Retroactivity
McNally v. United States gave new hope to defendants convicted
of mail fraud under the intangible rights theory. The Supreme
Court's ruling meant that those defendants did not commit a crime
under the Mail Fraud Act.' 8 Accordingly, allowing convictions re-
turned under the now invalid intangible rights theory to stand would
be a "miscarriage of justice."' 49 The lower courts have applied Mc-
144. Id.
145. Id. at 27.
146. Id. The Court compared the defendants' crime to embezzlement, which is included in the
concept of fraud, and affirmed the convictions. Id. at 27-28; see Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 189
(1902) (defining embezzlement as "[tlhe fraudulent appropriation to one's own use of the money
or goods entrusted to one's care by another").
147. Carpenter has been applied in a nonmail fraud context. See United States v. Fowler, 932
F.2d 306, 310 (4th Cir. 1991). In Fowler, government information was found to be intangible
property for the purpose of a federal theft and embezzlement statute. Id. at 309; see 18 U.S.C.
§ 641 (1988). Section 641 makes it a felony for anyone who
embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, or
without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher, money, or thing of
value of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, or any property
made or being made under contract for the United States or any department or
agency thereof . . . . [providing the value of the property exceeds $100].
Id.
148. Ingber v. Enzor, 841 F.2d 450, 453 (2d Cir. 1988).
149. United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 205 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S, 1084
(1989); e.g., Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) (holding that the petitioner's con-
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Nally retroactively to avoid such miscarriages of justice.' The ret-
roactive application of McNally was necessary since defendants con-
victed under the intangible rights theory had no opportunity to
object to its use at either the trial or appellate levels because the
theory was so entrenched in the courts. 5'
Defendants convicted under the Mail Fraud Act before McNally
have used one of two methods to have their convictions overturned:
1) a writ of coram nobis' 52 or 2) a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255.153 Both procedures allow defendants to challenge
viction for violating a subsequently invalidated Selective Service induction order resulted in a
"miscarriage of justice").
150. United States v. Shelton, 848 F.2d 1485, 1489 (10th Cir. 1988). The Tenth Circuit said
that allowing a conviction under the intangible rights theory to stand would be improper because
"the defendant [convicted under the intangible rights theory was] . . . not subject to trial on the
charge [of mail fraud]." Id.
151. Ingber, 841 F.2d at 453. The courts have unanimously found that the McNally decision
was fully retroactive. See, e.g., United States v. Osser, 864 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1988) (ruling that
a trial court lacked power to convict a defendant, for the proven activity must necessarily be
retroactive); Magnuson v. United States, 861 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that McNally is
to be applied retroactively); United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1988) (ruling that a
failure to state an offense may be raised anytime to avoid a miscarriage of justice), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1084 (1989); United States v. Shelton, 848 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding that a
nonconstitutional decision concerning the reach of a federal statute is retroactive); United States
v. Ochs, 842 F.2d 515 (1st Cir. 1988) (ruling that courts must consider any supervening change in
law after a judgment was entered); Ingber, 841 F.2d 450 (stating that McNally must be applied
retroactively because the trial court lacked the authority to convict or punish); United States v.
Mandel, 672 F. Supp. 864 (D. Md. 1987) (holding that a conviction can be attacked on a § 2255
motion if the law had been changed since trial and appeal), affd, 862 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 491 U.S. 906 (1989). Postconviction proceedings are possible due to McNally, but they
take into account intangible property due to the Carpenter decision. The McNally decision also
applies retroactively to defendants convicted under the federal wire fraud statute. United States v.
Gimbel, 830 F.2d 621, 627 (7th Cir. 1987); see 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1986).
152. The function of a writ of coram nobis is
to bring attention of court to, and obtain relief from, errors of fact, such as a valid
defense existing in facts of case, but which, without negligence on defendant's part,
was not made, either through duress or fraud or excusable mistake, where facts did
not appear on face of record, and were such as, if known in season, would have pre-
vented rendition of the judgment questioned.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 337 (6th ed. 1990) (citing People v. Tuthill, 198 P.2d 505, 506 (Cal.
1948)).
153. This statute reads in pertinent part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claim-
ing the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in viola-
tion of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without
jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maxi-
mum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the
court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. . ..
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the
prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon
the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and
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their convictions in the court where they were sentenced. 1 4 The two
procedures differ, however, for a writ of habeas corpus requires that
the petitioner be in custody, while a writ of coram nobis is only
available after the defendant has served his sentence.155 Otherwise,
a writ of coram nobis provides the same general relief as a writ of
habeas corpus. 156
2. Coram Nobis
A writ of coram nobis allows a defendant who has served his sen-
tence to have his conviction expunged because of a fundamental er-
ror which led to his being found guilty.' 51 The improper interpreta-
tion of a statute is a fundamental error. 58 This fundamental error
in interpreting the scope of the Mail Fraud Act had the effect of
allowing defendants convicted before McNally under the improper
intangible rights theory to petition the court to reverse their
convictions. 59
Generally, to obtain a reversal under coram nobis, a defendant
must show: "(1) a more usual remedy is not available; (2) valid
reasons exist for not attacking the conviction earlier; (3) adverse
consequences exist from the conviction sufficient to satisfy the case
make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds
that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed
was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has
been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to
render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the
judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial
or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988).
154. YACKLE, supra note 11, §§ 36, 166.
155. Id. § 36.
156. United States v. Bonansinga, 855 F.2d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 1988).
157. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 514 (1954).
158. If the statute had been interpreted properly, the defendant would not have been convicted.
YACKLE, supra note 11, § 164; see also United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir.)
("Without coram nobis relief, the petitioners, who contested their guilt at each stage of the pro-
ceeding, would face the remainder of their lives branded as criminals simply because their federal
trial occurred before rather than after the Supreme Court's ruling in McNally."), cert. denied,
491 U.S. 906 (1989).
159. Mandel, 862 F.2d at 1075. These defendants were not given the opportunity to object to
the intangible rights theory. This is because, prior to McNally, it was the established precedent in
all of the circuit courts. See Ingber v. Enzor, 841 F.2d 450, 454 (2d Cir.1988) (finding it unfair to
penalize the defendant for failing to challenge entrenched precedent); see also United States v.
Osser, 864 F.2d 1056, 1061 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a defendant who was convicted in 1972
had the opportunity to challenge the intangible rights theory, which was not yet precedent at the
time of that conviction).
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or controversy requirement of Article 1II; and (4) the error is of the
most fundamental character."' 60
United States v. Walgren'61 shows how this test applies to a mail
fraud conviction which was based on the intangible rights theory.
The defendant in Walgren was a Washington state legislator who
mailed a falsified campaign disclosure form." 2 He was convicted
and served his sentence.' 63 Subsequently, he filed a petition for a
writ of coram nobis, claiming the government's only ground for
charging him with mail fraud was under the now invalid theory of
intangible rights." 4
The court looked at the four factors for granting a writ of coram
nobis: 1) because the conviction was handed down prior to McNally,
the court found that the defendant had no reason to attack the con-
viction at trial or on appeal;'65 2) the defendant was subject to the
adverse consequence of larger potential sentences for convictions in
the future; 6 3) the conviction was based on a fundamental error,
the improper interpretation of a statute;16 7 and 4) the defendant had
no other relief available.' 68 The court vacated the conviction. 6 9 The
test to satisfy a writ of coram nobis is not difficult to meet, and,
once met, the previous conviction is overturned.
3. Habeas Corpus Under Section 2255
A pre-McNally mail or wire fraud conviction can also be chal-
lenged by a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2255, applies to defendants whether they were found
guilty by a jury or entered a plea of guilty. 70 A defendant must be
160. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 604 (9th Cir. 1987). The adverse conse-
quences must be more than the effect of having to spend time in prison. Osser, 864 F.2d at 1061.
For example, the loss of the right to vote or the possibility of more severe sentences for future
convictions are consequences that will support a writ of coram nobis. United States v. Keane, 852
F.2d 199, .203 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
161. 885 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1989).
162. Id. at 1419. The defendant did not report that he had purchased a news clipping service.
He did not know he bought the service from a government agent. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1420.
165. Id. at 1421.
166. Id. at 1422.
167. Id. at 1423-24; see supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text (discussing misinterpreta-
tion as a fundamental error).
168. Walgren, 885 F.2d at 1423-24.
169. Id. at 1424.
170. Williams v. United States, 805 F.2d 1301, 1306 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied. 481 U.S.
19931 1519
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in custody, however, to get a mail fraud conviction overturned
through a writ of habeas corpus. 171
Relief under section 2255 does not take the place of a timely ap-
peal.172 Under McNally, this rule does not present a problem; peti-
tioners did not have a chance to challenge the use of the intangible
rights theory because at the time it was acceptable grounds for a
mail fraud conviction.173
4. How the Court Analyzes Petitions Under Coram Nobis and
Habeas Corpus
In a postconviction proceeding, the fundamental question is
whether the defendant was convicted for a crime under the Mail
Fraud Act as interpreted by McNally. 7" During these proceedings,
the court will look at the indictment and the jury instructions. 175
First, the indictment must charge an act that constitutes a crime
under the relevant statute. 76 Next, the government must present
1039 (1987). The petition for habeas corpus must be directed to the sentencing court. YACKLE,
supra note 11, at 153-54. Habeas corpus can be used to attack convictions not based on criminal
conduct. Id. at 162; see, e.g., Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974). A court will grant the
writ if upholding the conviction would result in a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 346.
171. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1987).
172. Johnson v. United States, 838 F.2d 201, 202 (7th Cir. 1988).
173. But see United States v. Osser, 864 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a defendant
prosecuted in 1972, before intangible rights was an established theory in the jurisdiction, could not
invoke McNally to have his conviction overturned). If a pre-McNally mail fraud defendant is
seeking habeas corpus relief, but never made a direct appeal, he must satisfy the cause and
prejudice standard. See, e.g., United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (finding that cause and
actual prejudice is the proper standard in § 2255 cases); Theodorou v. United States, 887 F.2d
1336, 1339 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that § 2255 does not take the place of a direct appeal);
Williams, 805 F.2d at 1306 (ruling that a defendant who pled guilty can use the cause and
prejudice standard). To satisfy the standard, the defendant "must show both (1) good cause for
his failure to pursue an issue on direct appeal and (2) actual prejudice stemming from the alleged
constitutional violation"; see Theodorou, 887 F.2d at 1340; see also Messinger v. United States,
872 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that the defendant was not prejudiced by use of the intangi-
ble rights theory, as the indictment and jury instructions also alleged a deprivation of a property
right); United States v. Griffin, 765 F.2d 677, 682 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that both elements of
the cause and prejudice standard must be satisfied).
174. See YACKLE, supra note 11, at 166 (concluding that the function of coram nobis is the
same as that of § 2255).
175. See, e.g.. United States v. Gimbel, 830 F.2d 621, 627 (7th Cir. 1987) (demonstrating a
court's review of the indictment and the jury's required findings); see United States v. Walgren,
885 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Osser, 864 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1988); United
States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 906 (1989); Ingber v. Enzor,
841 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1988).
176. Gimbel, 830 F.2d at 624 ("In order to be valid, an indictment must allege that the defend-
ant performed acts which, if proven, constituted a violation of the law that he or she is charged
with violating.").
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facts that show that the charge was based upon the deprivation of
money or a property right."7 These general principles also apply to
the jury instructions. Instructions which state only an intangible
rights theory are improper under McNally."8 Furthermore, the gov-
ernment cannot seek to uphold the conviction on a theory different
than that alleged in the indictment or given in jury instructions. 179
In postconviction proceedings, the courts do not look only at the
literal language of the instructions or the indictment.180 Instead, the
courts will look to the substantive allegations to "determine whether
the conduct alleged and necessarily found to have occurred by the
jury constituted an offense.''8 If the indictment has multiple alle-
gations, there is the risk that it will be impossible for the court to
determine what theory the jury followed.' 82 In this situation, the
court must decide whether the jury convicted the defendant on all
the facts necessary to be proved under the proper theory. 183
Because many indictments and jury instructions contain multiple
allegations, the courts developed the "easily separable" theory.'84 In
such a case, the government must show there was a single scheme
177. Ward v. United States, 845 F.2d 1459, 1462 (7th Cir. 1988).
178. United States v. Wellman, 830 F.2d 1453, 1463 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that McNally
prescribes more than a rule of pleading).
179. United States v. Italiano (Italiano 1), 837 F.2d 1480, 1486 (11 th Cir. 1988). The govern-
ment is not allowed to argue a different theory on appeal because the indictment must give a
defendant warning of what he is being charged with, or else he will not be able to put on a proper
defense. United States v. Zauber, 857 F.2d 137, 143 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1066
(1989), and cert. denied, Scotto v. United States, 489 U.S. 1066 (1989); see United States v.
Baldinger, 838 F.2d 176, 181 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that a defect in an indictment charging the
defendant polygraph examiner with mail fraud and alleging invalid intangible rights theory was
fundamental and required reversal of a mail fraud conviction).
180. Wellman, 830 F.2d at 1462.
181. Id. In the Wellman case, the indictment and jury instructions alleged both a deprivation of
property rights and a deprivation of intangible rights. Id. at 1463. The court found that both
allegations involved the same conduct, and one scheme could not be proved without proving the
other. Id. Because the government proved facts that showed a deprivation of property consistent
with the jury instructions, the court upheld the conviction. Id. at 1463, 1465. However, if there is
no allegation in the indictment or jury instructions charging a deprivation of property rights, the
court will vacate the conviction. United States v. Covino, 837 F.2d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1988).
182. United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d 1183, 1189 (6th Cir. 1987).
183. Id.
184. United States v. Eckhardt, 843 F.2d 989, 997 (7th Cir.) (ruling that allegations which are
insufficient to state an offense are mere surplusage (citing United States v. Cooke, 833 F.2d 109
(7th Cir. 1987))), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 839 (1988); United States v. Cooke, 833 F.2d 109 (7th
Cir. 1987) (finding that the charges in an indictment were easily separable and did not prejudice
the jury). Under the theory, if the fraud scheme has multiple objectives and only some objectives
invoke the intangible rights theory, the remaining charges will be sufficient to sustain a conviction
if they are "easily separable" from the intangible rights charges, which are considered "mere
surplusage." Eckhardt, 843 F.2d at 997.
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that had the dual effect of depriving a victim of property rights and
intangible rights.' 85 As long as only one scheme is charged, the in-
sufficient charges do not infect the remainder of the indictment or
jury instructions that dealt with the deprivation of monetary or
property rights.'86 The easily separable analysis is also applied to
the charges when the defendant enters a guilty plea. 8
E. Postconviction Proceedings Generally
Through these postconviction proceedings, courts have busily de-
fined the boundaries of the McNally decision beyond the require-
ment that the government must prove a deprivation of money or
property rights. All courts hold that the government is not required
to show that the defendants benefited from the scheme.' 88 Courts
also have not required that the victim actually lose money as long as
the scheme was aimed at defrauding the victim of money or prop-
erty. 8 9 Thus, to determine if an alleged scheme involved only intan-
gible rights, the courts look to see if there was any "concrete eco-
nomic harm," that is, if the victim was in danger of losing money or
property. 9
185. United States v. Bonansinga, 855 F.2d 476, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1988).
186. Cooke, 833 F.2d at 110 (viewing the allegations of other objectives as surplusage); see
United States v. Folak, 865 F.2d 110, 113 (7th Cir. 1988) ("The presence of some language
referring to an intangible rights theory is not always fatal to the indictment."). Accordingly, to
avoid the possibility that the jury convicted the defendant solely on the intangible rights theory, it
is important that the charges all stem from the same scheme. Messinger v. United States, 872
F.2d 217, 222 (7th Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Bonansinga, 855 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.
1988) (stating that the scheme had a dual effect of depriving the public of both a property right
and an intangible right and the government could not prove one theory without proving the other).
187. Eckhardt, 843 F.2d at 997-98. In Eckhardt, the defendant pled guilty to four charges
stated in his indictment. Id. at 991. The first three alleged deprivation of intangible rights, while
the fourth alleged a deprivation of money and property. Id. at 996-97. The defendant pled guilty
to all charges, and the court found the charges easily separable, upholding the defendant's convic-
tion. Id. at 997-98.
188. See, e.g., Lombardo v. United States, 865 F.2d 155, 159 (7th Cir.) ("McNally did not
posit the further requirement that the scheme to obtain money or property by fraudulent means
result in a benefit to the schemers."), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989); see also United States v.
Barber, 881 F.2d 345, 349 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the government does not have to show
that the victim was actually defrauded of property), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 922 (1990).
189. See, e.g., United States v. Cosentino, 869 F.2d 301, 307 (7th Cir.) (finding that it is not
necessary that a plea actually result in financial loss or that the victim profit from the scheme as
long as the defendant intended to defraud him of some of that money), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 908
(1989); see United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163 (7th Cir.) (stating that the plan was aimed at the
fraudulent deprivation of money or property), cert. denied. 474 U.S. 838 (1985).
190. See United States v. Asher, 854 F.2d 1483, 1494 (3d Cir. 1988) (ruling that the bottom
line of the scheme must cause the victim monetary or property losses), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029
(1989); United States v. Wellman, 830 F.2d 1453, 1462 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that the
1522
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Cases have arisen, however, in which the property analysis is diffi-
cult to apply to the facts.19 The government must show that the
indictment alleged an actual deprivation of property. 92 There are
three areas in particular that have undergone judicial scrutiny: 1)
schemes to deprive a victim of material information; 2) schemes
violation of intangible rights ordinarily results in no concrete economic harm). A deprivation of
property has been found in a case where the defendant falsified an application to obtain a permit
to drive a school bus. United States v. Granberry, 908 F.2d 278 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill
S. Ct. 2024 (1991). The school district said they would not have offered the defendant the job if
he had filled out the application truthfully. Id. at 278. The court said that an employment con-
tract involves the right to control money and therefore a sufficient property interest was found to
sustain a mail fraud conviction. Id. at 280-81; see also Lombardo, 865 F.2d at 159-60 (finding
that a scheme of influencing legislators and competitors to deprive the Teamsters Union of the
highest bid on property the union was selling was a mail fraud violation).
191. For example, courts have ruled differently on whether the government has a property in-
terest in a cash bail bond. See Ward v. United States, 845 F.2d 1459 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that
because the defendant owed no fines for his drunk driving conviction, the state's security interest,
and therefore property interest, had lapsed). But see Messinger v. United States, 872 F.2d 217
(7th Cir. 1988) (holding that acceleration of a bond refund by a judge deprived the state of its
security interest in the cash bail bond).
192. See United States v. Gimbel, 830 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1987). In Gimbel, the defendant was
trying to transfer drug money to Swiss bank accounts. Id. at 623. He did it by withdrawing the
money in amounts of $9,990; this avoided federal currency reporting requirements, which required
banks to file reports for withdrawals in excess of $10,000. Id. The bank inadvertently filed a
report, and the defendant was caught. Id. The government argued that this scheme deprived the
government of property because it was done to avoid paying taxes on the money. Id. at 626.
Because the indictment did not mention these tax consequences, the court said that there was no
allegation of a deprivation of property, and it reversed the defendant's conviction. Id. at 627; see
also United States v. Herron, 825 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that there was no violation of
the wire fraud statute absent allegations that the defendants conspired to deprive the United
States of income taxes).
As long as the indictment mentions the lost money, courts have ruled that the government has
an interest in uncollected tax revenues. See United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1310 (7th
Cir.) (ruling that an allegation that a money laundering scheme deprived the government of tax
revenue satisfied McNally's "money or property" requirement), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1004
(1989); United States v. Doe, 867 F.2d 986, 989 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the granting of
improper real estate assessments deprived the government of money); United States v. Regan, 699
F. Supp. 36, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that a scheme involving fraud in securities trading
satisfied the McNally requirement). The court in Regan reasoned:
The alleged purpose of the [defendant's] transactions was to defraud the [U.S.] gov-
ernment of tax revenue. The defendants argue that this cannot be characterized as a
scheme to defraud the government of property, because the government's property
interest in tax revenue does not vest until a tax deficiency is declared. Whether the
government had a vested property interest during the life of the scheme is irrelevant.
If the alleged scheme had been brought to fruition, it would have fraudulently de-
prived the government of tax receipts. That was the alleged purpose of the scheme.
Surely that putative monetary detriment satisfies the McNally requirement.
Id.; see also United States v. Folak, 865 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1988) (declaring that the government
has a property interest in the proceeds from a debtor's auction).
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where the defendant receives a bribe or kickback; and 3) schemes to
obtain a license or franchise.
1. Disclosure of Material Information
Many intangible rights cases involve a defendant depriving the
government or private citizens of material information.19 While
courts may find that the indictment implied a loss of property,19 4
they will look at the whole indictment before making such a deter-
mination.' 95 In particular, after Carpenter v. United States,196 the
government has had an easier time sustaining convictions in cases
where the defendants revealed confidential business information.19 7
When a defendant misuses confidential business information, the
government does not have to show quantifiable monetary harm to
the business. 198 The harm to a business's reputation is enough for a
court to uphold a conviction. 99
Another way to assess confidential business information is to de-
termine whether it constitutes part of the victim's stock-in-trade.
193. See, e.g., United States v. Matt, 838 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir.) (involving the defrauding of an
employer by filing false sales reports and selling promotional items for personal gain), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1035 (1988); see also United States v. Fagan, 821 F.2d 1002, 1009 (5th Cir. 1987)
(finding that where a defendant created a phony corporation to hide kickbacks from his employer,
a mail fraud violation occurred), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988).
194. Matt, 838 F.2d at 1358-59. Here, the defendant sold his employer's promotional cigarettes
for his own economic gain, covering up his fraud by mailing in false sales reports. Id. at 1357. The
court found this to be "economically material information" and said the government proved that
the employer did lose money. Id. at 1357-58.
195. See United States v. Huls, 841 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1988). In Huls, the court found the
indictment alleged a deprivation of "material information," but prefaced this with a quote of the
lower court stating that "[a] scheme to defraud need not contemplate loss of money or property to
the victims." Id. at 112. The court said that the term "material" did not refer to economic loss,
and that the jury could, and in fact did, apply the term to nonproperty rights. Id.
196. 484 U.S. 19 (1987). The actual postconviction proceedings still stem from the McNally
decision, limiting mail fraud convictions to those schemes leading to a deprivation of property.
197. See United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715 (1 lth Cir.) (finding a violation where the de-
fendant used a talent agency's client list to further a child pornography scheme), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 921 (1989); United States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1988) (ruling that a defendant
who disseminated confidential information and shared profits with partners was guilty of mail
fraud), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1040 (1989).
198. In Diwan, the defendants used a talent agency to obtain the names of young girls. 864
F.2d at 717. The defendants posed as filmmakers and convinced some of the girls' parents that
they needed to take nude photographs of their children. Id. While the court found no specific
economic harm to the agency, it found that the victim was deprived of intangible property along
with modeling services, photographs, and likenesses, and upheld the mail fraud conviction. Id. at
719.
199. Grossman, 843 F.2d at 86. The Grossman court reasoned that reputation had commercial
value, as a firm can gain or lose clients based upon it. Id.
1524 [Vol. 42:1499
BORRE v. UNITED STATES
This approach was developed in United States v. Cherif200 The de-
fendant in Cherif worked at the First National Bank of Chicago. 0 1
After being informed of his termination, Cherif had his secretary
falsify a document which allowed him to retain his key card. 202 This
allowed him access to the bank's data entry department after busi-
ness hours.2 0 a The defendant subsequently used the keycard to break
into files relating to business transactions, which included informa-
tion on the finances and performances of the bank's client compa-
nies. 04 The bank required its employees, including Cherif, to sign
an "integrity policy" in which employees agreed not to disclose this
information. 05 Cherif used this information to buy and sell stock.20
Eventually, the SEC and the FBI discovered the defendant's actions
and arrested him.20 7
The defendant argued that he did not deprive the bank of prop-
erty, and that, therefore, under McNally and Carpenter, he did not
violate the Mail Fraud Act.20 8 The Seventh Circuit interpreted Car-
penter as extending the statute's reach to all forms of property -
intangible as well as tangible - while foreclosing conviction for a
deprivation of intangible rights. 20 9 The question was whether the in-
formation the defendant obtained fit within the parameters of prop-
erty as defined by McNally and Carpenter. The court found that the
indictment did not allege a deprivation of intangible rights but,
rather, of intangible property. 10
According to the defendant, the bank dealt in lending money and
providing financial services, whereas the victim in Carpenter was in
the business of publishing news and information.' In this respect,
the information in Carpenter was part of its stock-in-trade. Here,
however, Cherif claimed that the information was not part of the
200. 943 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1564 (1992).
201. Id. at 694.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 694-95. He also shared this information with his former fellow employees and his
friends. Id. at 695.
207. Id. Apparently, Cherif's former fellow employee figured "that a clear conscience, self pres-
ervation, or both were more important than friendship." Id.
208. Id. at 697.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 698 ("[T]he evidence was sufficient to show Cherif schemed to obtain confidential
information (that is, property).").
211. Id. at 697.
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bank's stock-in-trade and, thus, not the bank's property. 212
The court did not recognize this distinction.218 The Seventh Cir-
cuit ruled that the information was background used in developing
the bank's stock-in-trade. 14  The information was valuable to the
bank because it was the equivalent of raw materials needed by the
bank to provide financial services. 15 The court thus held that the
information was the bank's property and upheld Cherif's
conviction.21 6
2. Bribes and Kickbacks
Some mail fraud defendants have been convicted for schemes in-
volving bribes or kickbacks. The government has had less success
sustaining the convictions for bribery schemes than those involving
kickbacks.
In a typical bribery case, such as United States v. Holzer,217 the
defendant was a government official who took money in exchange
for ignoring a public duty. In these cases, the government has ar-
gued that the victim - the public who expects such duties to be
performed - was entitled to the bribe money under the theory of
constructive trust.21
The First Circuit has criticized this theory, saying it is unfair to
the defendant, as the constructive trust theory was never put to the
jury.2 9 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has commented that the
theory is particularly inapplicable when government officials were
taking bribes, unless it can be shown that the government wanted
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. ("It was a unique product and Cherif stole it.").
215. Id. at 698 (stating that financial services were the bank's product).
216. Id. at 698-99.
217. 840 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 486 U.S. 1035 (1988). There, a judge accepted
bribes from lawyers who had cases before him and from persons who sought appointment as re-
ceivers. Id. at 1345.
218. See United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d 1183, 1188 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that the
victim was deprived of property, and that the bribe proceeds were held in constructive trust),
vacated, 877 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1989). A constructive trust is a
[tirust created by operation of law against one who by actual or constructive fraud,
by duress or by abuse of confidence, or by commission of wrong, or by any form of
unconscionable conduct, or other questionable means, has obtained or holds legal
right to property which he should not, in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 314 (6th ed. 1990).
219. See United States v. Ochs, 842 F.2d 515, 525-26 (lst Cir. 1988); see also United States v.
Shelton, 848 F.2d 1485, 1491-92 (10th Cir. 1988) (overturning defendant's conviction because the
defendant was not given the opportunity to defend against the constructive trust theory in court).
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the official to take bribes so it could capture the proceeds under the
constructive trust theory.2 Accordingly, the public/government has
no property interest in bribes taken by public officials. Thus, the
convictions would be overturned.
Unlike bribery cases, the government does not need to rely on the
constructive trust theory when deciding mail fraud cases involving
employees taking kickbacks. 2 ' In kickback cases, it is uniformly
held that if prices were raised for an employer to get the funds to
pay the kickback, there has been a deprivation of property. In
Ranke v. United States, the defendant maintained that prices were
not raised because he received kickbacks. 22 The defendant, who
procured subcontractors for his employer, a contractor, submitted
extra work orders and raised a subcontractor's bid in order to get a
kickback.2 The Seventh Circuit held that if the extra work was not
actually performed, then the contractor was obviously deprived of a
property interest.224 Furthermore, if the extra work was performed,
the defendant was still liable under McNally because he deprived
the contractor of the right to control how its money was spent.2 5
Since the government was able to show a deprivation of property,
the defendant's conviction was upheld.226
220. See Holzer, 840 F.2d at 1348. The Seventh Circuit noted the difference between an em-
ployee taking money intended for his employer and taking a bribe, where the money is never
intended for the employer. Id. at 1347. The court disagreed with the Sixth Circuit in Runnels "on
the question whether such principles can be used to save cases that had been brought and tried
under the now-discredited 'intangible rights' theory." Id. The Seventh Circuit said the only situa-
tion in which a mail fraud/bribery conviction could be sustained is where the government had
tried to recover the bribes and the defendant tried to conceal the payments, thereby depriving the
government of a property interest. Id. at 1348.
221. See United States v. Shyres, 898 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 821 (1990);
Ranke v. United States, 873 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1989).
222. Ranke, 873 F.2d at 1038-39.
223. Id. at 1039.
224. Id.
225. Id. In Ranke, the contractor only thought it was paying for the work performed and did
not realize that the defendant was taking a percentage of the payments. Id.; see Shyres, 898 F.2d
at 652 (upholding a conviction for a scheme involving false invoices designed to get Anheuser-
Busch to pay for work that had not been done); United States v. Kerkman, 866 F.2d 877 (6th
Cir.) (sustaining a mail fraud conviction for a kickback scheme to obtain a government contract),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 828 (1989).
226. Ranke, 873 F.2d at 1040.
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3. Licenses and Franchises
a. Licenses
Many defendants with convictions based on schemes involving li-
censes and franchises have also challenged these convictions under
McNally. The courts, however, do not agree as to whether a license
constitutes a government property interest under McNally.22 7
The Seventh Circuit, for example, in Frank v. United States,
found that a license constituted a property right.228 In Frank, the
defendant attorney tried to prevent a drunk driving charge from ap-
pearing on his client's record.229 Upon a drunk driving conviction,
police normally forward the driver's license to the Department of
Motor Vehicles. 2 0 To hinder this action, the defendant bribed the
court bailiff to take his client's driver's license so it would not go to
the Department of Motor Vehicles.2 3 1 The court said that because
the license was part of the record the judge sends to the department,
the department had a property interest in the license.23 2 The court
reasoned that because the record was the state's property and the
license was part of the record, the license was state property.233
The Third Circuit, in United States v. Martinez2 34 also found a
license to be state property. In Martinez, the defendant sent fraudu-
lent documents to the state of Pennsylvania in applying for a medi-
cal license.235 The court acknowledged that the medical license was
227. See United States v. Granberry, 908 F.2d 278 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that a license to
drive a school bus is not government property), cert. denied, 11l S. Ct. 2024 (1991); United
States v. Kato, 878 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1989) (ruling that the government has no property interest
in pilot licenses); Toulabi v. United States, 875 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that a license to
drive a taxi was not city property); United States v. Murphy, 836 F.2d 248 (6th Cir.) (stating that
bingo permits are not property of the government), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988). Contra
Frank v. United States, 914 F.2d 828 (7th Cir. 1990) (concluding that the government has a
property interest in a driver's license); United States v. Martinez, 905 F.2d 709 (3d Cir.) (holding
that a state medical license is government property), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1017 (1990).
228. Frank, 914 F.2d at 833.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 832-33.
231. Id. at 832.
232. Id. at 833. In determining that the license was part of the record, the court looked to state
law. Id. The court contrasted this with the Murphy decision, where the licenses in that case, bingo
permits, were not classified as property by state law. Id. at 833-34; see United States v. Murphy,
836 F.2d 248 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988).
233. Frank, 914 F.2d at 833.
234. 905 F.2d 709 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1017 (1990).
235. Id. at 710-11. The defendant was accepted into a residence program at a Pennsylvania
hospital, passed the relevant examinations, and received the license. Id. He was subsequently
charged with and convicted of a mail fraud scheme to defraud the state and its citizens by fraudu-
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certainly property to the licensee." 6 Then, looking at United States
v. Carpenter,37 the court said that the Supreme Court "found it
significant that traditional property law recognizes the right of a
corporation to enjoin the use of confidential information. 23 8 By
analogy, the court reasoned that since Pennsylvania could enjoin
Martinez's medical license, the license must be state property. 39
The court further noted that it did not matter that this property
interest had no value to the issuer of the license. 40 Concluding that
the state lost its right to keep the medical licenses for itself and to
issue them to persons who were properly qualified, the court held
that the state involvement was not merely as a regulator, but also as
a dispenser of a property interest which it was free to enjoin. 4'
Finding that the state was deprived of property, the court upheld
the defendant's conviction. 42
Other courts do not view a state's interest as property. 243 These
courts generally adhere to the theory that a license is property of
the recipient when issued, but it never constitutes property to the
government. 4 What the license represents to the government is a
regulatory interest. 245 According to one court, "[f]rom the govern-
ment's perspective, ... the license is a promise not to interfere
rather than a sliver of property. 246
lently obtaining a medical license. Id. at 711. Martinez filed a writ of coram nobis, and the district
court overturned his conviction. Id. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, saying the license rep-
resented a property interest to the state, and upheld the conviction. Id. at 713.
236. Id. at 713.
237. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
238. Martinez, 905 F.2d at 713.
239. Id.
240. Id. "We see nothing in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the mail fraud statute that
requires or supports this theory of incipient or embryonic property." Id.
241. Id. at 714. The court then looked at the latest amendment to the mail fraud law and said
this was a sign that the mail fraud law was to be interpreted broadly. Id. at 715; see 18 U.S.C.
§ 1346 (1988) (codifying the amendment which reincorporates the intangible rights theory in
mail fraud cases); infra notes 294-97 and accompanying text (discussing this latest amendment).
242. Martinez, 940 F.2d at 716.
243. See, e.g., United States v. Kato, 878 F.2d 267, 269 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a pilot
license issued by the FAA is not government property).
244. See id.; see also United States v. Murphy, 836 F.2d 248, 253-54 (6th Cir.) (ruling that a
license is merely a piece of property), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988).
245. See Toulabi v. United States, 875 F.2d 122, 125 (7th Cir. 1989); see also United States v.
Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that export licenses were not government prop-
erty but merely embodiments of government regulation); United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d 36 (2d
Cir. 1988) (holding that the government regulatory interest in arms sales did not constitute a
property right).
246. Toulabi, 875 F.2d at 125.
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The Seventh Circuit, for instance, did not find a state property
interest in a license in Toulabi v. United States.47 In Toulabi, the
defendant sold the answers to the test that Chicago cab drivers were
required to pass to get a taxi-cab license.24 8 The court said that the
city did not have a property interest in the information on the tests,
because this information was not confidential. 249 The court distin-
guished Carpenter by pointing out that, unlike the victim in that
case (the Wall Street Journal), the city of Chicago did not make
money from selling tests. 5 ' The license, in essence, only represented
a legal entitlement to the government, not a property interest.2 51
Similarly, cases involving other types of regulatory interests illus-
trate that such interests do not constitute property rights. For in-
stance, both United States v. Evans52 and United States v.
Schwartz253 involved defendants who gave false information to the
government in order to facilitate military sales.254 Both courts found
that the government's right to control future arms sales was a regu-
latory right, not a property right. 55
In Evans, the court addressed "whether the right of the United
States to veto sales of U.S.-made or licensed weapons by one foreign
government to another is a property right for mail fraud pur-
poses. '256 The defendants in Evans filed false end-user certificates 257
to conceal the fact that they were selling arms to Iran.2 58 The gov-
ernment claimed deprivation of a property right due to its interest
as a nonpossessor in the sale of the arms. 259 The court said that
unlike most nonpossessory interests, such as fee simple determinable
and reversionary rights, the government, as a nonpossessor in this
247. 875 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1989).
248. Id. at 123.
249. id. at 125. The court pointed out that all the information on the test could be found on a
map and that the city did not have a property interest "in the fact that Cornell Avenue is east of
Drexel Street. ... Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.; see United States v. Granberry, 908 F.2d 278, 279 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that "li-
censing authorities have no property interest in licenses or permits"), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2024
(1991).
252. 844 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988).
253. 924 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1991).
254. Id. at 413; Evans, 844 F.2d at 37.
255. Schwartz, 924 F.2d at 417; Evans, 844 F.2d at 42.
256. Evans, 844 F.2d at 37.
257. End-user forms tell the government that the seller is shipping the arms. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 41.
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circumstance, never had such possessory interests in the arms.260
The court ruled that the government's interest in the arms sales
was in its capacity as a regulator, not as a property holder. 261 If
regulations did create a property interest, the court reasoned that
taken to an extreme, the government would have a property interest
in all other items it regulates, such as heroin and toxic waste. 62
Since there was no property deprivation under McNally, the court
overturned the convictions.26 3
Similarly, in United States v. Schwartz,264 the defendant lied to
the government about who was buying the arms and where the arms
were going. 65 The Schwartz court followed the reasoning in Evans.
The Second Circuit concluded that the fact that the government en-
forces its interest through the issuance of licenses does not turn its
regulatory interest into a property interest.266 The court said that
the government can regulate trade without the use of a license and
that the license merely stands for the legally required government
approval.26 7 The court further stated that any such approval will
take the form of a writing and that it would be "incongruous" to
determine what a property right is based on whether the piece of
paper at issue is a license or merely a letter.26 8
b. Franchises
A franchise resembles a license in that it is "a special privilege
conferred by the government on an individual or individuals."26 9
Courts do not agree whether a franchise constitutes a property right
under McNally. In United States v. Italiano (Italiano 11),21 0 the
Eleventh Circuit found that a cable television franchise is a property
260. Id.
261. Id. at 42.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. 924 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1991).
265. Id. at 414-16.
266. Id. at 417.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. 37 CIS. Franchises § 1 (1943). Courts disagree as to whether a franchise constitutes a
property right. See United States v. Italiano (Italiano I), 894 F.2d 1280 (11th Cir.) (finding that
a cable television franchise is a property right), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 896 (1990). Contra United
States v. Slay, 717 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (holding that a cable television franchise is not
a property right).
270. 894 F.2d 1280 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 896 (1990).
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right to the government.27' It relied on the reasoning provided by
the dissent in United States v. Italiano (Italiano I).2"2 The dissent in
that case looked to the fact that local franchising was an acceptable
means to regulate cable television.273 It considered the franchise a
grant by the state of a privilege with respect to property.274 The
dissent showed that Florida state law considered the franchise prop-
erty, even though the law did not say whether the franchise was
property in the state's hands.2 75 Based upon these propositions, the
Eleventh Circuit eventually found that a cable television franchise
constituted property for the purpose of the Mail Fraud Act. 276
However, other courts do not universally embrace this reasoning.
For example, in United States v. Slay,17 7 the court found the gov-
ernment's interest in granting franchises to be purely regulatory.278
The court said:
[A] franchise, once granted by the government for valuable consideration
and accepted by the individual or corporation, becomes property in the form
of a binding contract between the government and the franchisee. . . . How-
ever, "until an ordinance granting a franchise is accepted, the franchise
lacks the essential elements of a contract . . . [and] is a mere
proposition.
2 1
79
Thus, the mere contemplation of a franchise contract did not
amount to a property right according to the Slay court.280 Further-
more, the city did not have to give any money to the defendant, so
that aspect of the franchise agreement did not result in the depriva-
271. Id. at 1285.
272. Id. at 1285 n.6; see Italiano 1, 837 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1988) (Owens, C.J., dissenting).
The defendant's indictment was dismissed in the first Eleventh Circuit case because of McNally.
Id. The second Eleventh Circuit case dealt with the defendant's indictment on new charges.
Italiano 11, 894 F.2d 1280.
273. Italiano 1, 837 F.2d at 1492 (Owens, J., dissenting).
274. Id. ("[L]ocal franchising processes are an acceptable means of regulating the cable televi-
sion industry."); see 37 C.JS. Franchises § 8 (1943) (stating that a franchise is "a grant by the
state").
275. Italiano 1, 837 F.2d 1480 (Owens, J., dissenting); see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984) ("In answering the question now, we are mindful of the basic axiom
that '[p]roperty interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law.' ").
276. Italiano 11, 894 F.2d at 1285.
277. 717 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Mo. 1989).
278. Id. at 692.
279. Id. at 693 (citing 12 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 34.06, at 23 (3d
ed. 1986)); see also 12 EUGENE MCQUILLIN. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 34.03, at 11 (3d ed.
1986) (defining a franchise).
280. Slay, 717 F. Supp. at 693.
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tion of a property right.28' Therefore, the court determined that no
property right existed until the franchise was awarded. 2
4. Summary
After McNally v. United States,2 3 many defendants convicted of
mail fraud challenged their convictions claiming that they were con-
victed under the no longer valid intangible rights theory. In all of
these cases, the courts determined whether the victim of the scheme
suffered concrete economic harm. In cases involving a deprivation of
material information, courts have been willing to find such economic
harm as a deprivation of an intangible property right under Carpen-
ter v. United States.284 As long as the government can show that the
victim used this material information for financial gain,28" the court
will sustain the conviction.
Defendants have more success in challenging convictions involving
bribery schemes.2 " The government will usually be unable to prove
that the victim has an interest in bribes received by the defendant,
because the defendant has not taken property from the victim.2 8 7
Therefore, bribes involve the deprivation of intangible rights rather
than property rights.
However, with schemes involving kickbacks, the government can
more easily sustain a conviction. 88 Since the victim often ends up,
in reality, paying the kickback, the victim suffers real economic
harm. For example, if an employee takes a kickback for steering
contracts a vendor's way, the vendor may raise the contract price
that the employer will end up paying. The employer becomes the
victim, having to pay more for the contract than necessary. Thus,
the victim loses property from the scheme, and McNally does not
281. Id. at 694.
282. Id. at 694-95; see also 37 C.JS. Franchise § 8 ("An applicant for a franchise ... has no
property right until the application has been granted, and the denial of an application does not
constitute an invasion of a property right.").
283. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
284. 484 U.S. 19 (1987); see supra notes 129-47 and accompanying text (explaining the Car-
penter decision).
285. See supra notes 196-216 and accompanying text (illustrating cases which rely on Carpen-
ter's intangible property rights theory).
286. See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text (discussing the postconviction challenge of
bribery schemes).
287. See, e.g., United States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343, 1348 (7th Cir.) ("[Tihe state's financial
situation is the same whether he takes bribes or doesn't take bribes. . . . This is an intangible
rights case and only an intangible rights case."), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1035 (1988).
288. See supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text (discussing kickback cases).
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apply.
Finally, defendants convicted of schemes involving licenses and
franchises have challenged those convictions under McNally.2"9
Some courts have held that the issuance of a license or franchise is
similar to a business dealing in confidential information.290 There-
fore, the state's ability to give and subsequently revoke a license
gives the state a property right. However, other courts disagree with
this approach.291 These courts contend that the government suffers
no economic harm from these schemes. 92 Furthermore, these courts
point out that even in situations involving intangible property, there
must be a showing of concrete economic harm. In light of the
courts' disagreement on these issues, this area of McNally interpre-
tation has not been fully resolved.
5. Subsequent Change in the Statute
The McNally era was a short one, for Congress responded to the
Supreme Court's ruling with the passage of 18 U.S.C. § 1346. It
reads: "For purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme or artifice to
defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the in-
tangible right of honest services. 293 This statute, however, "cannot
be applied retroactively to acts committed before its enactment re-
gardless of whether such conduct occurred prior to McNally. '294
Therefore, the new law cannot be applied to the backlog of intangi-
ble rights cases.296
289. See supra notes 228-82 and accompanying text (summarizing license and franchise post-
conviction challenges).
290. See supra notes 228-42, 270-76, and accompanying text (summarizing cases finding a
property right in licenses and franchises).
291. See supra notes 243-68, 277-82, and accompanying text (providing examples where courts
found no property right).
292. See United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the government
did not have a property interest in export licenses, but merely a regulatory interest); Toulabi v.
United States, 875 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that Chicago did not have a property inter-
est in its taxi-cab licenses); United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that a
government's regulatory interest in arms sales does not constitute a property right); United States
v. Slay, 717 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (finding a government's interest in granting franchises
to be purely regulatory).
293. 18 U.S.C. § 346 (1988).
294. United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 419 (2d Cir. 1991); see United States v. Telink,
Inc., 910 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1990) (refusing to apply § 1346 retroactively). Contra United States
v. Johns, 742 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that the new statute could be applied retroac-
tively), affd, 972 F.2d 1333 (3d Cir. 1991).
295. See Hearing, supra note 86, at 110 (testimony of Scott Wallace) ("We are saying [intan-
gible rights] cases cannot be saved no matter what you do. These people were convicted under
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II. SUBJECT OPINION
As indicated in the Background section of this Note, the circuit
courts have applied the McNally doctrine inconsistently. 29 6 Mc-
Nally required that the victim suffer concrete economic harm in or-
der to have a property right for the purposes of the Mail Fraud Act.
However, the concept of concrete economic harm is sometimes over-
shadowed by the determination of whether the victim had a prop-
erty interest.
The Seventh Circuit faced this issue in Borre v. United States2 9
in sustaining a conviction brought under the intangible rights the-
ory. In Borre, the defendant, Kurtis Borre, sought habeas corpus
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the grounds that his conviction
was improper in light of McNally. 98 Borre acted as the decoy in a
scheme to guarantee the United States Cable Company (U.S.
Cable) the cable television franchise in the Village of Fox Lake,
Illinois.299 Borre did not reveal that some Fox Lake officials had an
interest in U.S. Cable.3 0 0 The mayor of Fox Lake owned a five per-
cent ownership interest in U.S. Cable, although it appeared that
Borre owned the shares.30 ' The mayor gave part of his interest to a
member of the board of trustees and a one percent interest to
Borre °.30  Borre then went before the village's board of trustees and
nominated U.S. Cable as the cable provider for Fox Lake. 3
U.S. Cable was awarded the franchise without having to resort to
competitive bidding. 4 It did not receive money from the village,
nor did it pay for the franchise °.3 5 The scheme was discovered, and
Borre was charged with conspiracy to commit an offense against the
United States and with mail fraud. 306 He pled guilty to both charges
tainted instructions.").
296. See supra notes 188-292 and accompanying text (explaining and illustrating courts' incon-
sistent analyses of McNally).
297. 940 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1991).
298. Id. at 215.
299. Id. at 216.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 217.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. See United States v. Borre, No. 89-C-3431, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 1989)
("[H]ence, the payment of the alleged bribes, in the form of an interest in U.S. Cable, did not
increase the cost to the Village of the agreement with U.S. Cable or decrease any profits made by
the Village on the agreement.").
306. Borre. 940 F.2d at 217; see 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988) (prohibiting conspiracies against the
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and was sentenced to two concurrent five-year sentences.30 7
Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided McNally, and one of
Borre's co-defendants, a Fox Lake government official, had his con-
viction vacated.30 8 Borre then filed a habeas corpus petition for re-
lief. 30 9 The district court vacated his conviction. 310
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit looked at the indictment to see if
any of the charges, in light of McNally, were sufficient to state an
offense. 31 It applied the cause and prejudice standard in analyzing
this habeas corpus petition. 1 2 It found sufficient cause because
Borre's conviction was prior to McNally; he thus could not have
previously contested his indictment on a deprivation of intangible
rights theory. 33 The court found prejudice because Borre could
show that he was convicted under an intangible rights theory and
that his conviction should be overturned.31 4 Since Borre pled guilty
to the charges, the court looked at the charges and his plea agree-
ment to determine whether he pled guilty to an offense punishable
under the Mail Fraud Act. 15
The government conceded that the first two charges were insuffi-
cient.3  It maintained, however, that the third theory stated that
Borre committed mail fraud based upon the deprivation of the right
to award the cable television franchise with full disclosure of owner-
ship interests.3 1 7 The court agreed, although on different grounds,
United States); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988) (prohibiting mail fraud).
307. Borre, 940 F.2d at 217.
308. Id.
309. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988) (governing habeas corpus petitions).
310. United States v. Borre, No. 89-C-3431, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 1989).
311. Borre, 940 F.2d at 217.
312. See supra notes 170-73 (explaining habeas corpus petitions).
313. Borre, 940 F.2d at 218.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 219.
316. Id. The insufficient indictments read:
[the defendants] [dievised and intended to devise and participate in a scheme to
defraud:
(a) the Village of Fox Lake and its citizens of their right to the legal, faithful and
honest services of Richard Hamm in the performance of acts related to his public
employment;
(b) the Village of Fox Lake and its citizens, its public officials and its public employ-
ees of the right to have the business of the Village of Fox Lake conducted honestly,
fairly and impartially, free from collusion, partiality, dishonesty, conflicts of interest,
and fraud . ...
Id.
317. Id. The third portion in count five of the indictment read:
[Tihe Village of Fox Lake and its citizens, its public officials and its public employees
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saying that Borre deprived Fox Lake of the cable television
franchise, which it held to be a property right."' 8 The court looked
to McNally and Carpenter and said that in order to determine
whether something is property, it must examine applicable state
law.3 19 The court said that a franchise represents the delegation of a
government function under Illinois state law.320
The court then looked to the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Italiano 11,321 which used the state law approach. In that case, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that a cable television franchise was property
for mail fraud purposes.322 The Borre court further found it relevant
that the federal government allows municipalities to assert control
over and run their own cable television operations . 23 It also consid-
ered the fact that cable television involves the creation and use of
easements.324 The court said that granting a franchise is not just a
regulatory act, but a governmental power derived from the legisla-
of the right to make a cable television franchise award with full disclosure of owner-
ship interests; and to obtain the Village of Fox Lake cable television franchise con-
tract by means of false and fraudulent representation and promises, knowing them to
be false when made.
Id.
318. Id. at 220.
319. Id.; see California v. Central Pac. R.R., 127 U.S. 1 (1888) (stating that it is within "the
powers and rights of sovereign States to classify the property within the State for purposes of
taxation"); Withers v. Granite City, 177 N.E.2d 181, 183 (111. 1961) (ruling that a city cannot
-allow use of land beneath a municipality's easements that interferes with the city's right to use the
land); People v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 32 N.E.2d 902, 904 (I11. 1941) (stating that a
franchise given to a utility is an exercise of a city's police power); People ex rel. Better Broadcast-
ing Council, Inc. v. Keane, 309 N.E.2d 362, 367 (II1. App. Ct. 1973) (finding that a city that
grants a franchise is using its legislative authority); see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986, 1001 (1984) ("[Property interests] are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law."). Con-
tra 47 U.S.C. § 521 (1988) (indicating that franchises are a means for a locality to regulate cable
television).
320. Borre, 940 F.2d at 220; see Lasher v. People, 55 N.E. 663, 665 (111. 1899) (stating that a
franchise is a "right which belongs to the government when conferred upon the citizen"); I
CHARLES D. FERRIS ET AL., CABLE TELEVISION LAW § 13.13, at 13-68.11 (1990) ("The modern
tendency is . . . to regard a [cable television] franchise as a delegation of a governmental function
to private entities to be performed in the furtherance of the public welfare."); see also 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *37 (describing a franchise as "a royal privilege, or branch of the
king's prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a subject").
321. 894 F.2d 1280 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 896 (1990).
322. Id. at 1285 n.6.
323. Borre, 940 F.2d at 220-21; see also Warner Cable Communications, Inc. v. City of
Niceville, 911 F.2d 634 (11th Cir. 1990) (upholding a municipality's right to run a cable
franchise), cert. denied, I II S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
324. Borre, 940 F.2d at 221; see also 47 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(2) (1988) (allowing the automatic
granting of easements over public right-of-way to cable franchises); 65 ILCS 5/11-42-11(c)
(1992) (same).
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ture. 23 In light of all of these factors, it held that the franchise was
a property right because it was derived from legislative power, and
because cable television requires the use of property to be
implemented. 326
The court, having determined the franchise was property, said
that the defendant deprived Fox Lake of this interest.32 7 Referring
to Ranke v. United States,328 the court said the village was denied
the right to control its property. 29 Since Fox Lake lost a property
right and Borre pled guilty to conduct consistent with the Mail
Fraud Act, the court denied his habeas corpus petition.33 0
Judge Easterbrook wrote a strong dissent based on his belief that
the franchise was not property. 331 He said that a franchise is similar
to a contract or a license and that McNally involved an analogous
scheme.3 2 He noted that the key to property rights in the context of
McNally is whether the victim lost something of value.333 Easter-
brook compared this franchise case to cases where a license was
held not to be property.3 3' In particular, the judge said the court
ignored the prior Seventh Circuit decision in Toulabi v. United
States,333 which held that the government did not have a property
interest in a license.336 Judge Easterbrook asserted: "Anyway . . . a
'license' is just a public announcement of permission to act. It indi-
cates that the government will leave you alone if you do
something. 3 37
The dissent then disputed the majority's contention that to convict
under the Mail Fraud Act the government only has to show the
victim lost control of the property. 338 Easterbrook said that Ranke339
325. Borre, 940 F.2d at 221.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 222.
328. 873 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1989); see supra notes 222-26 and accompanying text (discussing
Ranke).
329. Borre, 940 F.2d at 222.
330. Id. at 223.
331. Id. at 224 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 225.
335. 875 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1989).
336. Borre, 940 F.2d at 225 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Ranke v. United States, 873 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1989); see supra notes 222-26 and ac-
companying text (discussing the Ranke decision).
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did not stand for this loss of control theory because, in Ranke, there
was an actual out-of-pocket loss.34 He also disagreed with the ap-
plication of state law to define property, arguing that McNally ade-
quately defined what the court should look at - concrete economic
harm - which could not be shown in this case. 4'
Alternatively, even if state law was to be applied, Judge Easter-
brook felt it was improperly applied in this case.342 He said that
cable television is a form of speech which can never be classified as
government property.3 43 The judge characterized a franchise as part
of the government's regulatory interest where the franchisee merely
asks the government's permission to perform a service. 44 The differ-
ence between a license and a franchise is that franchises are exclu-
sive.a4I Overall, Judge Easterbrook noted that the fact that cable
television systems often use easements to run cables is not important
since there are other ways to put together a system without using
the citizens' property. 4 6 Finally, Judge Easterbrook criticized the
majority's decision as an attempt to avoid the McNally and Toulabi
decisions to sustain a conviction. 47
III. ANALYSIS
Judge Easterbrook's dissent in Borre was correct. The majority
decision resulted from faulty analogies, improper application of rele-
vant case law, and a mistaken understanding of the governmental
interests involved in a franchise.
The majority ignored the factual similarities between the case at
340. Borre, 940 F.2d at 225 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
341. Id. at 226.
342. Id.
343. ld; see also Leathers v. Medlock, III S. Ct. 1438 (1991) (finding that cable television is
speech under the First Amendment); City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476
U.S. 488, 494 (1986) (find that cable television "plainly implicate[s] First Amendment inter-
ests"). In Preferred Communications, the Court said that the First Amendment interests for cable
television are protectable to a greater extent than newspapers, but to a lesser extent than radio
and television broadcasters. 476 U.S. at 494-95. The Court never referred to the cable franchise
as property. The case was remanded to determine if the denial of a franchise to a second operator
was a First Amendment violation. Id. at 495.
344. Borre, 940 F.2d at 225 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
345. Id.
346. Id. at 226; see also FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 247 (1987) (stating that
cable franchisees can use utility poles instead of underground lines under the Pole Attachments
Act).
347. Borre, 940 F.2d at 226 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("It is understandable that this insti-
tution sees McNally as a problem to be overcome rather than a rule to be implemented.").
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bar and McNally v. United States.3 48 Furthermore, it failed to no-
tice the differences between Carpenter v. United States49 and Borre
and improperly applied the Carpenter holding. As a result, the ma-
jority improperly ruled that Fox Lake was deprived of a property
interest because it determined the franchise to be property. This is
contrary to the authorities which show that a franchise, by itself,
merely represents a regulatory interest, rather than a property inter-
est. Accordingly, the Village of Fox Lake did not suffer concrete
economic harm, and, therefore, Borre did not commit the crime of
mail fraud.
A. United States v. Borre Was Decided Incorrectly
Both McNally and Borre dealt with government corruption. In
McNally, the Supreme Court concluded that the Mail Fraud Act
only covered schemes that affected the government as a property
holder. 5 ' In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the defini-
tion of "defraud" found in Hammerschmidt v. United States.351 The
Hammerschmidt Court said that "to defraud," within the context of
the Mail Fraud Act, usually means the victim was "[deprived] of
something of value ' '52 as a result of the scheme. 53
McNally's analysis of Hammerschmidt is relevant to Borre be-
cause Fox Lake never showed that it was deprived of something of
value. In fact, the district court, when it overturned Borre's convic-
tion, specifically found that the scheme caused no loss of money to
the village or to its citizens.354 The village did not pay money to
U.S. Cable, and U.S. Cable did not have to pay a fee for the cable
franchise.355 On appeal, however, the majority on the Seventh Cir-
cuit panel failed to address this point. The finding of the district
court should have foreclosed the argument that Borre and his co-
conspirators defrauded Fox Lake of money.
348. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
349. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
350. McNally, 483 U.S. at 359 n.8 ("[A]ny benefit which the Government derives from the
statute must be limited to the Government's interests as property holder.").
351. Id. at 358. See Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924) (holding that
incitement to disobey the Selective Service Act did not violate the Mail Fraud Act).
352. Hammerschmidt, 265 U.S. at 188.
353. See McNally, 483 U.S. at 358.
354. United States v. Borre, No. 89-C-3431, slip. op. at 2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 1989).
355. Id.
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1. The Seventh Circuit Improperly Interpreted McNally and
Carpenter
a. McNally is factually similar to Borre
The Borre majority briefly reviewed McNally but focused its at-
tention on Carpenter v. United States,35 disregarding the fact that
Borre's situation more strongly resembled McNally.35 7 Both Mc-
Nally and Borre involved government officials who failed to disclose
a financial interest in companies that had dealings with the govern-
ment. In McNally, the government'officials used their influence to
obtain commissions from an insurance agent who needed the ap-
proval of the same officials to renew his relationship with the
state.358 In Borre, the mayor and a fellow official failed to disclose
an interest in U.S. Cable.359 In both cases, the government did not
lose money. The citizens of Kentucky, in McNally, were deprived of
the right to give the state's workers' compensation contract to an
honest dealer.3 "' In Borre, the citizens of Fox Lake were deprived of
their right to issue the franchise to an honest company. 31 Neither
governmental entity lost property; each merely lost the ability to
make a fully informed and impartial decision. This right to make an
impartial decision is an intangible right, a right denied coverage
under the Mail Fraud Act, according to McNally.362
b. The Seventh Circuit improperly utilized the holding in
Carpenter
Despite the similarities to McNally, the Borre court relied on
Carpenter. It looked to Carpenter's clarification of the scope of what
constitutes property under the Mail Fraud Act.36 3 In Carpenter, the
Supreme Court ruled that because the common law recognized con-
fidential business information as property, such "intangible prop-
erty" would be recognized for the purposes of the Mail Fraud Act
356. Borre v. United States, 940 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1991); see Carpenter v. United States, 484
U.S. 191 (1987).
357. Borre, 940 F.2d at 225 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, with the change of a few
details, Borre's case is a replay of McNally's.").
358. McNally, 483 U.S. at 352.
359. Borre, 940 F.2d at 217.
360. McNally. 483 U.S. at 355-60.
361. Borre, 940 F.2d at 219.
362. See supra notes 88-128 and accompanying text (discussing McNally).
363. Borre, 940 F.2d at 219-20.
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as modified by McNally.3 4 The Carpenter Court, however, did not
further define what qualified as intangible property.
The Borre court looked to Carpenter as a guide even though there
is little factual similarity between Borre and Carpenter. In Carpen-
ter, the defendant, an employee for the Wall Street Journal, con-
spired to use confidential information reserved for a Journal col-
umn.3 65 The defendant and his co-conspirators used the information
for profit.366 The Court found that the information, though intangi-
ble, was property for the purposes of the Mail Fraud Act.367 It re-
lied on the fact that the Wall Street Journal derived a benefit, in
fact profits, from its ability to control and disseminate the informa-
tion. 68 On one hand, this appeared to be an intangible right and
therefore not property under McNally, in that the newspaper only
lost its ability to decide when to disclose the information. On the
other hand, this right to disclose information was essential to the
economic success of the Wall Street Journal, which sells informa-
tion, just as a furniture store sells tables and chairs. In this respect,
the Carpenter decision appears justified, but, nonetheless, inapplica-
ble to Borre.
The franchise in Borre bears little relation to the information dis-
closed in Carpenter. Unlike the Wall Street Journal, Fox Lake was
not in the business of handing out franchises for profit. In Carpen-
ter, the Court said that the scope of McNally reached intangible
property rights.' 69 McNally requires a loss of value of some sort by
the victim, so intangible property must have some value to the
holder to be covered by the Mail Fraud Act. 370 Even if the franchise
is deemed intangible property in Borre, it should not be covered
under the Mail Fraud Act because Fox Lake took no value for it.
Therefore, the Borre court incorrectly relied on Carpenter; although
Fox Lake was defrauded of a legitimate franchise, it did not suffer
an economic loss and thus did not fall under McNally's definition of
property.
364. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987).
365. Id. at 23.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 26.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987).
1542 [Vol. 42:1499
BORRE v. UNITED STATES
c. United States v. Cherif and stock-in-trade
To understand the Seventh Circuit's analysis of Carpenter, it is
useful to look at the court's decision in United States v. Cherif.3 71
The Seventh Circuit conducted a more thorough analysis of Carpen-
ter in Cherif than in Borre. Cherif was factually similar to Carpen-
ter in that the defendant misused the bank's confidential business
information.3 7z The defendant gained access to the bank's invest-
ment files through an illicitly obtained pass and then made profita-
ble stock purchases.373
The Cherif court pointed out that Carpenter stood for the exis-
tence of intangible property and did not revive the doctrine of intan-
gible rights.374 It further stated that confidential business informa-
tion was clearly not the same thing as the intangible right to an
honest government.3 75 In this respect, Seventh Circuit precedent in-
terpreting Carpenter and McNally found that one purpose of Mc-
Nally was to prevent a vague statute from being used to prosecute
government corruption at the state and local level. Thus the applica-
tion of Carpenter to the franchise in Borre is problematic because
the conduct of the defendant in Borre certainly touched upon citi-
zens' right to honest government.
Cherifs factual differences, like those of Carpenter, make it inap-
plicable to Borre. The defendant in Cherif argued that the informa-
tion he obtained from the bank was not the institution's stock-in-
trade, and therefore did not qualify as confidential business informa-
tion as defined by Carpenter.376 The defendant claimed that the
bank was in the business of storing people's money, not of gathering
information.377 The Seventh Circuit disagreed.378 It reasoned that
while the bank was not in the business of publishing the informa-
tion, the information was still part of the bank's stock-in-trade be-
cause the information was essential to investments the bank made
371. 943 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1991).
372. Id. at 694.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 697.
375. Id. at 697-98.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 697. In Carpenter, the Supreme Court referred to the "Heard on the Street" col-
umn as part of the Wall Street Journal's stock-in-trade. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19,
26 (1987) (quoting International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918)).
378. Cherif 943 F.2d at 697.
19931 1543
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
and to the development of its stock-in-trade.7 9 The court ruled,
therefore, that the information was property of the bank and the
defendant's conduct fell under the Mail Fraud Act.3 80
Unlike the information stolen in Cherif a franchise is not-part of
the government's stock-in-trade. The Cherif court compared the
bank's confidential information to the raw materials needed to pro-
duce a product.38' However, the franchise at issue in Borre was not
part of any product being made by the government of Fox Lake.
Fox Lake did not -charge for the franchise. Had it done so, the
stock-in-trade argument would have more viability because the
franchise would be seen as a product of the village. But even this
argument may not hold much weight. In Cherif the defendant took
information from the bank and used it to buy stock, in essence be-
coming a competitor of the bank. These actions diminished the
bank's potential to buy the same stock, and by reducing the number
of available sellers, it cut into the bank's profits. This does not hold
true in Borre's case. Regardless of how Borre obtained the
franchise, Fox Lake (if it was charging for the franchise) still was
paid and suffered no financial loss.
2. The Franchise Represented Only a Regulatory Interest
The Borre court improperly relied on state law to support its
holding. State common law, moreover, fails to classify Fox Lake's
interest as property. The Borre court drew upon Carpenter's appli-
cation of state common law to show that a franchise is property. 382
The majority used state law to refute the contention that a franchise
is merely a grant of permission to perform a service from the gov-
ernment.383 It continued by referring to the granting of a cable tele-
vision franchise as a legislative, rather than a regulatory, func-
tion.3 84 It did not, however, explain how the term "legislative"
differed from "regulatory" or how this transformed it into a prop-
erty interest. Thus the court's explanation failed to justify its
conclusion.
The franchise represented a regulatory interest - not a property
379. Id.
380. Id. at 698.
381. Id.
382. Borre v. United States, 940 F.2d 215, 219 (7th Cir. 1991).
383. Id. at 221.
384. Id.
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interest, as pointed out in the Borre dissent.3 85 It is important to
remember that under McNally, the government only has an interest
in property it holds. This implies that a plaintiff must be deprived of
some sort of possessory interest in order to use the Mail Fraud Act.
The Second Circuit in United States v. Evans38 8 pointed out that
the government often has a regulatory interest in things in which it
has absolutely no property or possessory interest."8 7 As with the
weapons at issue in Evans,388 Fox Lake did not have the right to
possess the cable television franchise operated by U.S. Cable. Four
reasons exist for this position: 1) the franchise is not government
property; 2) the court improperly applied state law; 3) the court ig-
nored the previous cases on licenses; and 4) a cable television
franchise represents a recognized First Amendment interest.
a. A franchise is not property to the government
To reach its conclusion, the court in Borre had to establish that a
franchise is property. Standing alone, the phrase "a franchise is
property" is essentially true. The question is: To whom does the
franchise belong - to the issuer or to the holder? The Borre major-
ity looked to the Italiano I1189 court for guidance because the court
in Italiano H found that, in the mail fraud context, a cable televi-
sion franchise is property.39 Neither the Eleventh Circuit opinion in
Italiano II, nor the prior district court decision, 391 however, offers
any substantive reasoning as to why the cable franchise is property.
It is quite possible the two Italiano courts relied on the more
thorough analysis of cable franchises made in an earlier Eleventh
Circuit opinion relating to the Italiano case, Italiano I.92 In his dis-
sent from Italiano I, Judge Owens looked to Corpus Juris
385. Id. at 226 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("Public promises not to interfere with private
conduct . . . are not 'property' for purposes of the mail fraud statute.").
386. 844 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988).
387. Id. at 42.
388. 844 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988); see supra notes 256-62 and accompanying text (summarizing
the Evans case).
389. 894 F.2d 1280 (1Ilth Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 896 (1990).
390. Borre, 940 F.2d at 220.
391. United States v. Italiano, 701 F. Supp. 205 (M.D. Fla. 1988), aff'd 894 F.2d 1280 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 896 (1990).
392. Italiano 1, 837 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1988). In this case, the defendant had his conviction
overturned. Id. He was subsequently re-indicted. See Italiano, 701 F. Supp. at 206 (explaining the
history of the case).
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Secundum to define the character of a franchise.393 This source
states: "Franchises are property and are frequently invested with the
attributes of property generally. 394 Judge Owens took this quote
completely out of context. The same source states that a franchise
"is merely a right or privilege" that is "distinct from, and does not
embrace, property used or acquired in connection with the exercise
of the franchise . . ... " In the context of cable television, this
reflects the difference between the right to run a system, the
franchise, and the property which is necessary to run the franchise.
More importantly, the property right derived from a franchise
does not vest until the franchise is granted. 396 This property right is
intangible and is separate from the property used to carry out the
franchise.397 Until the government grants the franchise, all it is do-
ing is contemplating contracting with an individual, not holding
property. 398 Furthermore, what the Borre court, and accordingly the
Italiano II court, failed to consider is when the franchise becomes
property. Franchises are not property to the government; rather,
they "resemble direct regulation in execution. 3 99 Clearly, the au-
thorities do not support the contention that the state has a property
interest in the franchise. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit's reli-
ance on Italiano II is misplaced. Borre and his co-'conspirators
deceived Fox Lake to obtain the cable television franchise. Govern-
ment officials acted dishonestly. This seems to be more in line with
the invalid intangible rights theory than with the Italiano II court's
holding that a franchise is property.
b. State law does not prove that the franchise is property
Illinois law did not justify the Seventh Circuit's holding either.
The Seventh Circuit applied state common law to determine
whether a franchise is considered property.400 The sources relied on
393. 837 F.2d at 1492 (Owens, J., dissenting).
394. 37 CIS. Franchises § 8 (1943).
395. 37 Id. § 5.
396. United States'v. Slay, 717 F. Supp. 689, 693 (E.D. Mo. 1989) ("The government fails to
explain how mere contemplation of an ongoing contractual relationship rises to a property right
protected by the mail and wire fraud statutes."); see 12 MCQUILLIN. supra note 279, § 34.03, at
II.
397. 12 MCQUILLIN. supra note 279, § 34.03, at I1.
398. Slay, 717 F. Supp. at 693.
399. Mark A. Zupan, The Efficacy of Franchise Bidding Schemes in the Case of Cable Televi-
sion: Some Systematic Evidence, 32 J. L. & ECON. 401, 403 (1989).
400. Borre v. United States, 940 F.2d 215, 219-20 (7th Cir. 1991).
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by the majority do confirm that a government can grant a
franchise."'" None of the sources go so far, however, as to declare
that a franchise is property of the government.
The court also found significance in the fact that municipalities
can run their own cable systems, rather than awarding franchises to
private companies.4"2 This fact fails to establish whether a franchise
is property. Rather, it only stands for the proposition that the gov-
ernment does not have to grant a franchise to an independent entity.
The majority then looked at cases which characterize "the grant-
ing of a franchise as a legislative, not a regulatory act."'40 3 None of
these cases provide support for the contention that a franchise is
property to the government, but rather they recognize the regula-
tory function of a franchise.40 4 The cases deal with the propriety of
granting franchises, not with their character as property.40 5 Thus,
these cases do not refute the regulatory purpose of a franchise or
support its classification as property.
While looking at state law, the Seventh Circuit ignored the fed-
eral statute that deals with the franchising of cable systems. The
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 stated that Congress's
purpose in passing the legislation was to "establish guidelines for the
exercise of Federal, State and local authority with respect to regula-
tion of cable systems."' 06 The purpose of the franchise, as seen in
401. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *37 (defining a franchise as "a royal privi-
lege, or branch of the kings prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a subject"); see also Lasher v.
People, 55 N.E. 663, 665 (III. 1899) (stating that a franchise is "[a] right which belongs to the
government when conferred upon the citizen").
402. Borre, 940 F.2d at 220-21.
403. Id. at 221.
404. See California v. Central Pac. R.R., 127 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1888) (noting that a franchise is a
privilege granted for the public interest which is subject to public control and is not taxable);
Withers v. City of Granite City, 177 N.E.2d 181, 183 (II1. 1961) (holding that a grant to a
company to use city streets was not invalid if it did not divest public use or interests); People v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 32 N.E.2d 902, 904 (111. 1941) (finding that a city ordinance granting
a public utility use of the streets was an exercise of legislative authority not taxable as tangible
personal property); People ex rel. Better Broadcasting Council, Inc. v. Keane, 309 N.E.2d 362,
367 (il1. App. Ct. 1973) (holding that a grant to a cable television franchise was an exercise of
legislative authority not subject to mandamus).
405. Withers v. Granite City held that a city could not permit a use that infringes on the right
of the municipality to use land beneath the municipality's easements. 177 N.E.2d at 182. People
v. Commonwealth Edison Co. stated that "[a]n ordinance which grants the use of public streets to
a utility . . . is in the exercise of the police power ...." 32 N.E.2d at 904. People ex rel. Better
Broadcasting Council ruled that "the granting of franchises by municipalities to utility companies
or private persons to use the streets in the public interest constitutes an exercise of the city's
legislative authority." 309 N.E.2d at 367.
406. 47 U.S.C. § 521(3) (1988) (emphasis added).
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light of the statute, is to give the franchising authority (i.e., the lo-
cal government) the means to regulate the system.4"7 Nothing in the
statute implies that the franchise is the government's property.
Therefore, state law as applied by the Seventh Circuit is, at best,
inconclusive and does nothing to show that a franchise is property to
a local government. However, federal law seems to imply that the
purpose of the cable television franchise is to provide a consistent
regulatory scheme for cable providers. The federal law does not sug-
gest that the franchise is property for the individual municipality.
c. The court ignored the precedent of the license cases
In addition to its misplaced reliance on state law, the Seventh
Circuit, in Borre, ignored prior decisions regarding licenses. Gener-
ally, franchises and licenses are similar. The difference is that a
franchise is exclusive.408 The majority distinguished precedent deal-
ing with licenses, Toulabi v. United States,4 °0 by stating that the
granting of a franchise is a legislative, not a regulatory, act."1" This
apparently separates a franchise from a license. Yet the license and
franchise both grant the holder permission to perform an act. In
Borre's case, that act was the operation of a cable television
franchise. The majority supported its distinction by stating that a
franchise must be property because cable television, by necessity,
runs cables through the property of citizens. "11 As Judge Easter-
407. The text of 47 U.S.C. § 521 reads in pertinent part:
The purposes of this subchapter are to -
(1) establish a national policy concerning cable communications;
(2) establish franchise procedures and standards which encourage the growth and
development of cable systems and which assure that cable systems are responsive to
the needs and interests of the local community;
(3) establish guidelines for the exercise of Federal, State, and local authority with
respect to the regulation of cable systems;
(4) assure that cable communications provide and are encouraged to provide the wid-
est possible diversity of information sources and services to the public;
(5) establish an orderly process for franchise renewal which protects cable operators
against unfair denials of renewal where the operator's past performance and proposal
for future performance meet the standards established by this subchapter; and
(6) promote competition in cable communications and minimize unnecessary regula-
tion that would impose an undue economic burden on cable systems.
47 U.S.C. § 521.
408. Borre v. United States, 940 F.2d 215, 224-25 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
409. 875 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1989); see supra notes 247-51 and accompanying text (discussing
Toulabi).
410. Borre, 940 F.2d at 221.
411. Id.
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brook pointed out, however, there are other ways of putting together
a cable system that do not require easements over residential prop-
erty."12 For instance, this may be accomplished by installing cable
on the poles used by utility companies. 13 Thus, the majority failed
to show how the legislature granted the government property. Fox
Lake was only giving U.S. Cable permission to run a cable system
in their town. Even if Fox Lake required easements, they would be
required only as an effect of the franchise, not as the franchise it-
self. Therefore, the use of easements should not be considered in the
determination of whether a franchise is property.
Because the franchise/license distinction fails, Borre is clearly out
of line with Toulabi.4 14 In Toulabi, the city had no property interest
in the answers to a taxi driver's license examination.415 Likewise,
Fox Lake had no property interest in the franchise. Upon discovery
of the deceit, the village could have withdrawn the franchise, but
this would not be the same as gaining possession of the property.,"1
It would only mean that U.S. Cable no longer had permission to run
a cable television system in Fox Lake. The government could then
decide to run the system on its own, but it would not gain a property
interest until it held a vested right to run the system. Because all
Fox Lake was doing was giving U.S. Cable permission, and not giv-
ing up a property right, the court should have followed the reason-
ing in the Toulabi decision.
Frank v. United States"7 is likewise inapposite. In Frank, the
government was found to have a property interest in a driver's li-
cense.41 8 Under the law of Indiana, a surrendered license in a drunk
driving case is part of the court record and property of the govern-
ment upon possession.41 9 The license was retained to indicate to the
Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles that the defendant's license was
412. Id. at 226 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (citing FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245
(1987)).
413. See 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1988). This statute is commonly known as the Pole Attachments
Act.
414. Toulabi v. United States, 875 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1989).
415. Id. at 125.
416. But see United States v. Martinez, 905 F.2d 709 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1017
(1990). In Martinez, the Third Circuit held that the government of Pennsylvania had a property
interest in a fraudulently obtained medical license. The court implied that because the state had a
right to revoke the license, it was property under the mail fraud statute. Id. at 715.
417. 914 F.2d 828 (7th Cir. 1990).
418. Id. at 834.
419. Id. at 833.
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suspended. 420 The license was used like a cash bail bond,42' acting
as a type of security interest, to insure that the convicted driver
would be unable to operate his vehicle legally.
In Borre, the government could not show a similar possessory in-
terest in the franchise. In Frank, the property right did not stem
from the issuance of the license, but from its retention in the court
record. However, there was no such security interest endowed in the
cable television franchise, because there was no retention of the
franchise. Frank dealt with the physical license as property, whereas
Fox Lake possessed no physical manifestation of the franchise. So
while Seventh Circuit precedent holds that the government has a
property right in a license, it does not apply to the Borre case be-
cause Frank dealt with actual physical possession of the license.
Therefore, the court should have looked to Toulabi, under which it
would have found that the village of Fox Lake was not deprived of
property.
d. A cable television franchise is speech
The Borre majority relied on the fact that a municipality can run
its own cable franchise in deciding that the U.S. Cable franchise
was the property of Fox Lake.422 As the dissent pointed out, how-
ever, a cable television company engages in speech.423
Judge Easterbrook relied on the Supreme Court opinion in City
of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc."24 to argue that
the right to speech was not government property to be delegated to
franchisees.426 In Preferred Communications, the Supreme Court,
in dicta, said that the First Amendment interests in cable television
fall somewhere between those of newspapers, which are subject to
little government regulation, and broadcasters, who are watched
more closely due to the limited availability of broadcast frequen-
cies.42" The Court remanded the case to have the district court de-
termine if denying a franchise to a second operator in a large city is
420. Id.
421. See Messinger v. United States, 872 F.2d 217, 220 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that a cash
bail bond is a security interest and thus an intangible property right).
422. Borre v. United State, 940 F.2d 215, 220 (7th Cir. 1991).
423. Id. at 226 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
424. 476 U.S. 488 (1985).
425. Borre, 940 F.2d at 226 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
426. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. at 494-95.
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a First Amendment violation.427 The Court never referred to the
franchise as government property but referred to it only as a means
to regulate the system, particularly where cable lines are laid.42
The opinion indicates that a cable system is also subject to some
degree of regulation based upon its programming content.
Having established that cable television has some degree of First
Amendment protection, Judge Easterbrook said that the government
cannot grant the right to speak, as it is a right that already exists
through the First Amendment.4 29 This argument does not mean that
the cable system has no value; it obviously does. Rather, it shows
that what the government is granting is not the system itself, but
the right to operate a system to provide communications (and
speech) to its citizens. While the government, through statutory au-
thority,430 allows a city to run a system on its own, the government
is not giving the private entity the system. This was particularly true
in the Borre case, where U.S. Cable did not pay for the franchise. 31
Fox Lake was delegating its right, through the granting of a
franchise, to operate such a system. Rather than operate it them-
selves, Fox Lake chose to regulate a private company.
B. The Loss of Control Theory
The Seventh Circuit also erred in applying the loss of control the-
ory.432 The majority in Borre, after determining that a cable televi-
sion franchise was property, went on to show that Fox Lake was
deprived of that property4 3 because it lost control over the disposi-
tion of property. 34 Both the defendant and the dissent, however, ar-
gued that the victim had to show an actual out-of-pocket loss.4 35 On
this point, the dissent was correct.
The majority based its conclusion on Ranke v. United States.436
427. Id. at 495-96.
428. Id. at 490 n.l.
429. Borre, 940 F.2d at 226 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority ...treats [cable
television] as if it existed by sufferance of local authorities.").
430. E.g., 65 ILCS 5/11-42-11 (1992).
431. Borre v. United States, No. 89 C 3431, slip op. at 2 (N.D. III. Oct. 17, 1989).
432.. See supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text (explaining the loss of control theory).
433. Borre, 940 F.2d at 222.
434. Id.; see Ranke v. United States, 873 F.2d 1033, 1039 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
false promise of a subcontractor which caused a general contractor to lose control of property was
sufficient to result in a mail fraud conviction).
435. Borre, 940 F.2d at 222.
436. 873 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1989).
15511993]
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
In Ranke, the defendant adjusted a subcontractor's bid to his em-
ployer and received kickback payments from the subcontractor. 3
The defendant claimed that his employer did not actually lose
money because he accepted the altered bid and was awarded the
job.4 38 The court felt that this was irrelevant because Ranke's em-
ployer may have accepted another bid if he knew that part of the
money going to the subcontractor was being paid to Ranke.4 9 This,
therefore, represented a loss of control over the victim's property.
The dissent's argument was more accurate. In the Borre dissent,
Judge Easterbrook disagreed with how the majority interpreted
Ranke and said that the Ranke court required an actual loss of
money. " ' Ranke, by adjusting the bid, deprived his employer of
what would have been a lower bid, absent the bribe/kickback. 1
This argument is sound because in Ranke, the victim lost control of
his property interest; he could have awarded the contract to some-
one else. More importantly, Ranke asserted control over part of that
money. Perhaps if the facts were changed, the Borre majority's the-
ory would be more justifiable. If Ranke, for instance, was a friend of
the subcontractor and received no kickbacks, there would be a case
where the employer lost control without suffering an out-of-pocket
loss. But Ranke does not reflect such facts. Even if the theory is
termed "loss of control," there must also be an out-of-pocket loss.
Furthermore, even assuming the franchise is property, this loss of
control theory still does not meet the Carpenter standard. Fox Lake
did not sell the franchise to U.S. Cable and, thus, could show no
monetary loss. Although Fox Lake could have awarded the
franchise to another company, this would have had no economic ef-
fect on the village. It is possible that the premise for which Ranke
stands is correct, but as it stands, the case is not factually similar to
Borre. In Ranke, the victim suffered an economic loss. In Borre,
Fox Lake did not suffer any such loss.
IV. IMPACT
The impact of Borre can be assessed from two perspectives. To
the defendant, the consequences are obvious. It remains uncertain
437. Id. at 1039.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 1040.
440. Borre v. United States, 940 F.2d 215, 225 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
441. Id.
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how the decision will affect future coram nobis and habeas corpus
petitioners.
A. Effect on Borre
Kurtis Borre's mail fraud conviction was sustained. 42 Unfortu-
nately for him, his future legal avenues are limited. While he may
apply to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, this probably
will not bring a favorable result. The Supreme Court has not heard
any cases regarding the McNally v. United States4 " interpretation
of mail fraud since it decided Carpenter v. United States.4" It ap-
pears that with the enactment of the newest amendment to the Mail
Fraud Act, which revives the intangible rights theory, the Court has
little interest in further interpretation of McNally.44 5
B. Effect on Future Petitioners
The Seventh Circuit has "a copious backlog of intangible rights
cases." 446 There remain defendants petitioning the courts for relief,
and if Judge Easterbrook is correct, the courts are tired of overturn-
ing convictions. 4 Borre represents a broader interpretation of the
property rights defined by McNally and could signal a new direction
in the analysis of postconviction mail fraud proceedings.
1. State Law
The Borre court used state law to justify its conclusion that the
cable television franchise was a property interest of Fox Lake. 8
The two state law premises the court emphasized were: that a
franchise is a privilege a state grants that does not commonly belong
to its citizens; and, more importantly, that a municipality may run
its own cable system. 9
The Borre court's interpretation of state law may affect cases in-
volving a license or a franchise which seem to be intangible rights.
442. 910 F.2d at 224.
443. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
444. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
445. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988) (codifying the new amendment to the statute); see also
Borre, 940 F.2d at 226 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (noting that with the reinstatement of intan-
gible rights theory in § 1346 there is "no way to avoid McNally and Toulabi").
446. Borre, 940 F.2d at 226 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
447. Id.
448. 940 F.2d at 220.
449. Id. at 220-21.
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If a court can show that the government delegated a function that
the government could have done on its own, it appears that under
Borre, this franchise or license is a property right.
This interpretation of property rights is not limited to cable televi-
sion. Assume that a government-run institution decided, under stat-
utory authority, to give a franchise to provide the institution's food
services, rather than the government running its own cafeteria. Sub-
sequently, the winner of the franchise is found to be a company
secretly owned by a government official instrumental in awarding
the franchise. Under Borre, since the government could have run
the food service itself, it has a property right, in spite of the fact
that the government would not have lost any money. Borre thus
used state law to create property rights under McNally where none
previously existed.
2. Loss of Control
If the Borre interpretation stands, the Ranke loss of control the-
ory45° is broadened. The Borre court explicitly contradicted Mc-
Nally by stating that no out-of-pocket loss needs to be shown by the
victim.451 In essence, to have a deprivation of property rights under
Borre, the government has to show: 1) that the victim relinquished
control of something to the defendant and 2) that the defendant
would not have controlled the property without defrauding the vic-
tim, regardless of whether the victim suffered a monetary loss. Thus,
the Borre court justified its conclusion by using a loss of control
argument. This sounds not like a deprivation of property rights, but
rather like a deprivation of intangible rights. Ultimately, Borre finds
a new way to bring back the intangible rights theory in pre-Mc-
Nally convictions.
C. Application to Federal Theft Laws
The McNally line of cases has engendered a unique area of law
defining property interests. For the most part, the holdings have not
been useful in other contexts.
450. See supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text (discussing the loss of control theory).
451. Borre, 940 F.2d at 222; see 483 U.S. 350, 361 (1981) (requiring a deprivation of a prop-
erty right). The Ranke court got around this problem by distinguishing McNally on the grounds
that the state was not paying a portion of its premium to the defendants. In Ranke, unlike Mc-
Nally, the state paid fixed premiums. Ranke v. United States, 873 F.2d 1033, 1040 (7th Cir.
1989).
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This changed with the case of United States v. Fowler."52 The
defendant in Fowler was charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 641."11 Fowler, a civilian, utilized a Defense Department security
clearance to pass along classified information to government defense
contractors." 5' He argued that he did not steal property, because he
merely copied documents or recorded information from them.'55
The Fourth Circuit said the documents themselves were tangible
property."" Citing Carpenter, the court further held that the infor-
mation contained within the documents was property. 57 This infor-
mation thus had the requisite value, and the court upheld Fowler's
conviction .458
Borre v. United States may further expand the application of 18
U.S.C. § 641. The franchise, if Borre is correct, is a form of intan-
gible property. Schemes to illegally obtain a franchise or license
from the federal government may now be within the reach of the
statute. Unlike Fowler, where the value of the information was im-
plicit, the value of a license or franchise could be set at an arbitrary
level, by charging a one-hundred dollar fee, thereby automatically
invoking the statute. If Borre represents a new trend in the treat-
ment of franchises, then its application in the context of the theft of
government property is the next logical step.
CONCLUSION
"After McNally, the courts of appeals have discussed property
deprivation in a variety of factual settings, resulting in a somewhat
confusing web of caselaw."' 59 The history of mail fraud law is that
of a law the scope of which was expanded until McNally came
along and burst the balloon. Whether it was decided correctly is
dependent upon one's interpretation of that history. That past his-
tory and Congress's subsequent action have created a channel of law
that will be drying up soon. There are still people seeking to vacate
452. 932 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1991).
453. Id. at 308-09. The court stated that "[s]ection 641 provides whoever 'knowingly converts
to his own use or the use of another, or without authority . . . conveys . . . any record . . . or
thing of value of the United States' is guilty of a felony if the value of the property exceeds $100."
Id. at 309 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 641 (1988)).
454. Id. at 308-09.
455. Id. at 309.
456. Id. at 310.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 310, 318. The court did not expressly declare the information's value.
459. United States v. Shyres, 898 F.2d 647, 651 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 821 (1990).
155519931
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
their convictions, so all cases subsequent to McNally have in one
way or another sought to clarify the points made by that decision.
The courts have carved out ways to deal with a failure to disclose
information, with confidential business information, with licenses,
and with bribes. Very often these interpretations blur together.
Making the situation even more difficult is the fact that the inter-
pretations may be unnecessary if the indictment or jury instructions
only deal with intangible rights. In Borre, two counts of the indict-
ment clearly stated an intangible rights theory. The court's analysis
rested on whether the third count was proper under McNally. The
Borre majority improperly characterized a regulatory interest as a
property interest, and yet failed to show how the village lost money,
property, or control thereof. The case was wrongly decided under
McNally and appears to have brought some intangible rights con-
cepts back into the pre-18 U.S.C. § 1346 law.
Michael C. Bennett
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